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ABSTRACT
Low-skill workers are comparatively immobile: when labor demand slumps in a city, low-skill workers
are disproportionately likely to remain to face declining wages and employment. This paper estimates
the extent to which (falling) housing prices and (rising) social transfers can account for this fact using
a spatial equilibrium model. Nonlinear reduced form estimates of the model using U.S. Census data
document that positive labor demand shocks increase population more than negative shocks reduce
population, this asymmetry is larger for low-skill workers, and such an asymmetry is absent for wages,
housing values, and rental prices. GMM estimates of the full model suggest that the comparative immobility
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When a city experiences an adverse labor demand shock, the share of the adult population
with a college degree tends to decline (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). A standard explanation
for this pattern is that barriers to mobility are greater for low-skill workers (Topel, 1986;
Bound and Holzer, 2000).1
This paper proposes and tests an alternative explanation which focuses on why low-skill
workers may be disproportionately compensated during adverse labor demand shocks, rather
than why it may be disproportionately costly for them to out-migrate. This explanation
has two components. First, as documented below, adverse shocks substantially reduce the
cost of housing. This fact and the existing evidence that the expenditure share on hous-
ing declines with income imply that low-skill workers are disproportionately compensated
by housing price declines.2 Second, means-tested public assistance programs dispropor-
tionately compensate low-skill workers during adverse shocks. I document below that, not
surprisingly, aggregate transfer program expenditures are highly responsive to local labor
market conditions.
These two di⁄erent types of explanations ￿one based on mobility costs and one based
on compensating factors ￿are not incompatible; however, their relative importance ulti-
mately determines the actual incidence of local labor demand shocks. If out-migration of
workers is low primarily because of mobility costs, then the incidence of local labor demand
shocks will be primarily borne by workers; additionally, to the extent that mobility costs are
greater for low-skill workers, they may disproportionately bear the incidence of the adverse
shock. Alternatively, if the incidence of adverse local labor demand shocks is primarily
1The existence of greater barriers to mobility for low-skill workers is consistent with a large empirical
literature that has documented that the local labor supply elasticity is larger for high-skill workers than for
low-skill workers. For example, Bound and Holzer (2000) ￿nd that the elasticity of local labor supply with
respect to wages is signi￿cantly higher for college-educated workers than for workers with no more than a
high school education. Similarly, Topel (1986) ￿nds that local labor demand shifts generate much smaller
wage di⁄erentials among more educated workers. Topel writes ￿consistent with the greater geographic
mobility of more educated workers, their wages are less sensitive to both current and future changes in
relative employment.￿
2Of course, if low-skill workers are homeowners and not renters, then there is a negative wealth e⁄ect in
addition to the decline in the user cost of housing following a negative local labor demand shock. Consistent
with much of the recent urban economics literature (e.g., Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Moretti (2009)),
I assume in the model below that everyone is a renter. I also explore alternative speci￿cations which assume
that the demand for housing is homothetic, so that the expenditure share on housing is assumed to be the
same for high-skill and low-skill workers.
1borne by immobile housing and social insurance programs, then low-skill workers will be
disproportionately compensated and, consequently, less likely to out-migrate.
In this paper, I develop and estimate a spatial equilibrium model which captures how
wages, population, housing prices, and transfer payments re-equilibrate following a shift in
local labor demand. The model is based on the spatial equilibrium model in Roback (1982).
Following Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), the model in this paper allows for a concave local
housing supply curve, arising from the durability of the local housing stock.3 While the
Glaeser and Gyourko model assumes perfect mobility, I allow for heterogeneous mobility
costs which limit spatial arbitrage, as in Topel (1986). Unlike the preceding models, I
explicitly model local labor demand.
To give the basic intuition of the model, consider the following simpli￿ed version.4 The
main conceptual experiment in the model is that a single city experiences a (positive or neg-
ative) labor demand shock while a large number of other cities remain unchanged. Figures
1 and 2 provide graphical representations of the di⁄erent equilibrium responses of wages,
population and housing prices for four scenarios, depending on whether housing supply is
constant elasticity or asymmetric and whether workers are perfectly mobile or face mobility
costs when out-migrating.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium response when the elasticity of supply of housing is
constant.5 The ￿gure shows a positive shift in the labor demand curve which raises wages
by ￿. This increase in wages causes in-migration, which bids up housing prices until the
increase in housing costs exactly o⁄sets the wage increase (thus restoring the equilibrium
no-arbitrage condition for workers). If workers are perfectly mobile, then the ￿gure shows
that the e⁄ect of a negative shock (￿￿) is symmetric; i.e., wages, housing prices, and
population adjust by equal and opposite magnitudes (as shown by LA
￿ in the ￿gure). This
3Throughout the paper I use the term ￿concave housing supply curve￿to imply that positive housing
demand shocks increase housing prices less than equal-sized negative shocks reduce housing prices. More
formally, a concave housing supply curve implies that @2(housing price)=@(housing supply)2 < 0.
4In this simpli￿ed version of the model, workers in a city inelastically supply labor so that net migration
fully determines local labor supply. Workers also do not di⁄er in productivity, and there are no transfer
payments. The full model below introduces high-skill and low-skill workers as well as transfer payments.
Firms are perfectly mobile so that labor demand is perfectly elastic. Homogeneous housing units are supplied
by absentee landlords who live in other cities, and workers consume a ￿xed expenditure share of housing
(sh).
5This is equivalent to assuming that the housing supply curve is log-linear.
2symmetry comes from the log-linearity of the housing supply curve and the perfect mobility
of workers. If, alternatively, workers face non-negligible mobility costs, then there will be
less out-migration following a negative shock. With non-negligible mobility costs, the no-
arbitrage condition is now that the marginal worker must be indi⁄erent between staying and
paying c to out-migrate. In this case, both the population and housing price responses
are asymmetric: positive shocks increase population and housing prices more than negative
shocks reduce them (see LB
￿ in the ￿gure). Intuitively, while mobility costs constrain out-
migration, they do not similarly constrain in-migration because there are a large number of
potential in-migrants with negligible mobility costs (since the single city is assumed to be
small relative to the rest of the world). Therefore, the increase in population following a
positive shock is the same whether or not workers face heterogeneous costs of out-migration
(see L
+
￿ in the ￿gure)
In Figure 2, the housing supply elasticity is no longer constant. Speci￿cally, housing is
more elastically supplied following an increase in housing demand than a decrease in demand.
As discussed in greater detail in the main text below and in Online Appendix Section A.2,
this asymmetric housing supply curve is consistent with a simple model of durable housing
where housing units are not destroyed once created (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). When
workers are perfectly mobile, housing prices respond symmetrically (despite the asymmetry
in the housing supply curve). Intuitively, housing costs still must adjust to exactly o⁄set the
wage changes. Only population responds asymmetrically (as shown by LC
￿ in the ￿gure).
However, if workers have heterogeneous mobility costs to out-migrate as described above,
then in this case the asymmetry of the population response is even greater (see LD
￿ in the
￿gure), and housing prices also respond asymmetrically.
These scenarios give the intuition for the following two implications of the full model
derived below: (1) if positive labor demand shocks increase population more than negative
shocks reduce population, this suggests the existence of a concave housing supply curve
and/or heterogeneous mobility costs, and (2) if positive shocks increase housing prices more
than negative shocks reduce housing prices, that is consistent with the existence of hetero-
geneous mobility costs. The full model below shows that these implications continue to hold
in a richer setting with transfer payments and two types of workers.
The model guides the empirical strategy, which consists of two steps. In the ￿rst step,
3I test for asymmetric responses of wages, employment, population, and housing prices to
symmetric labor demand shocks. The validity of this exercise requires constructing plausibly
exogenous positive and negative shifts in local labor demand of equal magnitude. This paper
follows Bartik (1991) in constructing an instrumental variable for local labor demand shocks
by interacting cross-sectional di⁄erences in industrial composition with national changes in
industry employment shares. I ￿nd robust evidence using U.S. Census data that positive
local labor demand shocks increase population (and employment) more than negative shocks
reduce population (and employment) and that this asymmetry is greater for low-skill workers.
These robust asymmetric relationships for local population and employment contrast sharply
with the absence of any evidence of a similar asymmetric relationship for (any measure of)
wages, housing values, and rental prices, though all of these other variables respond strongly
to local labor demand.6 As the spatial equilibrium model makes clear, these results are
consistent with a concave local housing supply curve and limited mobility costs. While the
Bartik (1991) procedure has been widely used in labor economics and urban economics, to my
knowledge this is the ￿rst paper which uses this procedure to explicitly test for asymmetric
responses of wages, employment, and population to local labor demand shocks.
To quantitatively estimate the magnitude of mobility costs by skill and the shape of
the housing supply curve, in the second step of the empirical analysis, I estimate the full
spatial equilibrium model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator. The
GMM estimates suggest that the housing supply curve is concave and that mobility costs
(de￿ned as a fraction of income) are at most modest and are comparable for both high-skill
and low-skill workers. The GMM results reveal several other important ￿ndings. First,
the observed asymmetric population responses are primarily accounted for by an asymmetric
housing supply curve rather than due to substantial barriers to mobility. Second, the results
6The model in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) predicts a concave relationship between housing prices and the
exogenous labor demand, and these authors ￿nd supportive evidence of this prediction using an exogenous
shock based on climate. As discussed in more detail in the Online Appendix Section A.4, the key di⁄erence
between the model in this paper and the model in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) is that the model in this paper
assumes that housing units are homogeneous, while in the Glaeser and Gyourko model housing units have
heterogeneous, location-speci￿c amenities. In other words, in the Glaeser and Gyourko model, exogenous
shocks induce compositional changes in the distribution of location-speci￿c amenities in the housing stock,
and these compositional changes a⁄ect the (unconditional) average housing price. The di⁄erence in empirical
results comes from the fact that Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) use mean temperature to construct local amenity
shocks based on a dummy variable for whether or not the January mean temperature is greater than 29.1
degrees whereas I use variation in local labor demand.
4suggest that the observed di⁄erence in out-migration by skill is primarily accounted for by
transfer payments rather than to di⁄erences by skill in housing expenditure shares. Third,
the results suggest that the primary explanation for the comparative immobility of low-skill
workers is not higher mobility costs per se, but rather a lower incidence of adverse local
labor demand shocks. Consequently, much of the incidence of adverse labor demand shocks
is di⁄used to homeowners, landlords, and public assistance programs.7
Finally, I use the GMM estimates to construct counterfactual estimates of how local
labor markets would adjust to shocks if the system of means-tested transfer payments was
replaced with a system of mobility subsidies for both high-skill and low-skill workers. In this
alternative system, the skill composition of the local labor force is much less responsive to
shifts in local labor demand, but population continues to respond strongly asymmetrically
due to the asymmetric housing supply curve.
The estimation of the full model necessarily requires stronger assumptions than were
needed to test for asymmetric responses to shocks. In order to be able to consistently
estimate the relative magnitude of mobility costs by skill, I must assume that unobserved
changes in local amenities induced by local labor demand shocks are not di⁄erentially valued
by high-skill and low-skill workers. To be able to consistently estimate the absolute magni-
tude of mobility costs, however, a stronger assumption is needed; namely, that unobserved
changes in local amenities are uncorrelated with local labor demand shocks. Because of
this, the analysis of the absolute magnitudes of mobility costs should be interpreted more
cautiously.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.
Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and the data. Section 4 presents the reduced form
empirical results. Section 5 investigates the robustness of these results. Section 6 presents
GMM estimates of the full model. Section 7 concludes.
7There is a related literature on the e⁄ect of income on migration (Kennan and Walker, 2009) and the
e⁄ect of welfare decisions on the individual migration decision (Kennan and Walker, 2008). Both of these
papers are highly complementary to this paper, as they employ a very di⁄erent empirical approach. Kennan
and Walker (2008) use NLSY data to estimate a rich structural model of migration. Their data set of welfare-
eligible women with a high-school education contains 88 moves (out of 3,466 person-year observations and
694 individuals), and the data are used to identify the e⁄ect of income on migration probability. Also related
to this paper is the recent literature on the causal e⁄ect of education and geographic mobility (Wozniak,
2006; Malamud and Wozniak, 2008).
52 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a simple spatial equilibrium model of a local labor market that captures
how wages, population, housing prices, and transfer payments re-equilibrate following a local
labor demand shock.8 The heart of the model is a no-arbitrage condition in which the
marginal worker is indi⁄erent between remaining in the city receiving the shock and moving
away (Roback, 1982). This condition implicitly de￿nes a local labor supply curve which
determines the amount of migration in response to a labor demand shock. The model
below allows for mobility costs, which limit spatial arbitrage and cause the incidence of
the labor demand shock to fall at least partially on workers (Topel, 1986).9 Additionally,
the model admits two types of workers (high-skill and low-skill) who di⁄er in productivity,
imperfectly substitute in production, and may potentially di⁄er in their housing expenditure
shares, eligibility for transfer payments, and mobility costs. If an adverse labor demand
shock causes relatively greater out-migration of high-skill labor, the model clari￿es when
this is because the incidence of the shock is borne by other factors that disproportionately
compensate low-skill workers and when this is due to greater barriers to mobility for low-skill
workers.
The conceptual experiment is that a single city (out of a large universe of cities) experi-
ences a labor demand shock between the ￿rst and second period. For simplicity, the model
is presented as a two-period model in order to rule out the e⁄ects of long-run expectations,
the di⁄erences between temporary and permanent shocks, the option value from moving,
and other issues arising in dynamic spatial equilibrium models. I focus on decadal changes
in the empirical analyses below in order to minimize the in￿ uence of these other factors, and
I leave a rigorous treatment of these dynamics for future work.
To give the general intuition of the model, consider an adverse local labor demand shock in
a city. This shock will reduce wages, which encourages out-migration and, ultimately, lowers
housing prices until the no-arbitrage condition is restored for the marginal worker. The
amount of out-migration is determined by the magnitude of mobility costs, the generosity of
8The model is a ￿local general equilibrium￿model in the sense that labor demand shocks a⁄ect non-labor
markets within the city; however, it is not a full general equilibrium model because when the single city is
shocked, the (minimal) e⁄ects on the rest of the universe are ignored.
9Topel (1986) is primarily concerned with understanding di⁄erences between permanent and transitory
shocks; in the simple two-period model in this paper, all shocks are necessarily permanent.
6transfer payments, and the elasticity of supply of housing in response to a decline in housing
demand.
The four main components of the model (labor demand, transfer payments, housing
market, and labor supply) are now discussed in detail.
2.1 Labor Demand
Assume a large number of cities indexed by i, and de￿ne the (large) number of high-skill
and low-skill workers in city i and time t as Hit and Lit. Production of the homogeneous
tradable good y is given by the following CES aggregate production function:10





where ￿ is a share parameter, ￿ measures the returns to scale of the labor aggregate, ￿ is the
relative e¢ ciency of high-skill labor and ￿ is related to the elasticity of substitution between
high-skill and low-skill labor by ￿H;L ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿).11 The ￿it term is a city-speci￿c index of
local labor demand. In the empirical section below, I argue that my instrumental variable
for local labor demand is a plausibly exogenous source of variation in ￿it.


















Totally di⁄erentiating the above wage expressions results in the following conditions for
the evolution of wages in terms of exogenous labor demand shock (￿￿it) and the endogenous
10For simplicity, capital is not included in the model. This could be important if part of the incidence of
labor demand shocks falls on owners of capital. Since the empirical results are based on decadal changes, it
seems reasonable to assume that the elasticity of supply of capital over this time period is fairly large.
11Let ￿ be the share of high-skill workers in the labor market. Then if ￿ = (1￿￿)￿￿1=((￿￿)￿￿1+(1￿￿)￿￿1),
￿ will give the equilibrium wage premium.
7migration responses (￿Hit and ￿Lit):
￿w
H
it = ￿￿it + ((￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿))￿Hit + (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿Lit (1)
￿w
L
it = ￿￿it + ((￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))￿Lit + (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿)￿Hit (2)
where ￿ = ￿(￿H)￿=((1 ￿ ￿)L￿ + ￿(￿H)￿), and the ￿ operator represents the percentage
change over time.
2.2 Transfer Payments
Means-tested public assistance programs are available only to low-skill workers and are mod-
eled as a constant elasticity function of wages:12




where tit is the transfer income for the representative low-skill worker, ￿ T is a constant, and
￿ is the elasticity of public assistance income with respect to low-skill wages. The constant
elasticity assumption is a simpli￿cation; empirically, I do not ￿nd robust evidence of a
nonlinear or asymmetric e⁄ect of labor demand shocks on aggregate expenditures on transfer
programs, so this assumption appears to be a reasonable approximation. The equations
above imply the following expression for the evolution of transfer income in response to




I assume ￿ < 0, which implies that transfer programs provide wage insurance, and I de￿ne
sL
t as the share of total income that comes from transfer programs for low-skill workers; for
high-skill workers, sH
t = 0.
12Using PSID data from 1990, I calculate that 0:5% of households receiving AFDC income during the past
year had a household head with at least a college degree. Among households receiving food stamps during
the past year, the fraction is 0:7%. The percentages for a household head with a high school education or
less are 79:1% (AFDC) and 82:6% (Food Stamps).
82.3 Housing Market
A homogeneous housing stock is supplied by absentee landlords, and the aggregate housing
supply curve is given by HS(ph
it), where ph
it is the price of housing. Workers have identical
preferences over housing and the homogeneous tradable consumption good. Existing empiri-
cal estimates suggest that housing consumption is a normal good with an income elasticity of
demand less than one; for example, Polinsky and Ellwood (1979), ￿nd a (permanent) income
elasticity of 0:80￿0:87. These results imply that the demand for housing is non-homothetic
and suggest that the expenditure share of housing should be lower for high-skill workers.
Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, this is evident in the cross-section: in
1995, the housing expenditure share declines by more than 8 percentage points going from
bottom 20% in income to top 20% in income distribution, declining from 38:5% to 30:0%.13
De￿ning sH
h and sL
h as the housing expenditure shares for high-skill and low-skill workers,
respectively, then these facts indicate that sL
h > sH
h . In the GMM estimates below, I report
results assuming sL
h > sH
h and results which assume sL
h = sH
h .
Insetad of assuming a speci￿c utility function to derive the demand for housing, I instead
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This expression is an approximation since I am implicitly assuming that any changes in
income induced by a shift in labor demand are small so that income e⁄ects can be ignored.
Empirically, the changes in wages within skill groups are small relative to the di⁄erences in
wages across skill groups, so this assumption is sensible.
The initial supply-demand equilibrium in housing market in the ￿rst period is given by
HS(ph
it) = HD(ph
it). Totally di⁄erentiating this equilibrium condition gives the following








it + ￿Hit) + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿y
L
it + ￿Lit) (4)
13Expenditure share by quintile (going from lowest to highest income quintile) is the following: 38:5%,
32:9%, 31:8%, 30:0%, and 30:0%.
9where ￿ is the high-skill share of aggregate housing demand and ￿y
j
it gives the change in total










it. If the housing supply
curve has constant elasticity, then ￿HS(ph
it) = ￿ ￿ ￿ph
it. Since housing is a durable good,
however, the housing supply elasticity is not likely to be constant. Instead, the housing
supply elasticity will be larger for increases in housing demand than for decreases in housing
demand due to the durability of the housing stock (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). Formally,
durable housing implies that ￿HS(￿ph
it) is increasing in ￿ph
it. The Online Appendix Section
A.4 presents a simple model which provides microfoundations for a concave housing supply
curve based on slow depreciation of the housing stock and a heterogeneous distribution of
costs of supplying housing.
2.4 Labor Supply
For simplicity, I assume that workers inelastically supply labor to their local labor market,
so that all variation in local employment comes only from migration decisions. The local
labor supply curve is then implicitly de￿ned by a mobility condition which states that the
marginal migrant must be indi⁄erent between remaining in city i and moving to any other
city.
I introduce costly spatial arbitrage by assuming that workers have heterogeneous mobility
costs. I construe mobility costs broadly to encompass both ￿nancial and psychic barriers
to out-migration as well as heterogeneous tastes and distastes for a given location. Thus
unlike Topel (1986), I allow mobility costs to take on positive and negative values. Positive
values encompass both actual moving costs as well as preferences for the current city, while
negative values represent distaste of potential in-migrants for a given area. Formally, I
model this by assuming that mobility costs for workers in city i are independently drawn
from distributions MH
i (m) and ML
i (m) (with support [0;1)), while the mobility costs of
in-migrating into city i for the workers living in all of the other cities are drawn from the
distributions MH
￿i(m) and ML
￿i(m) (with support (￿1;0]). Mobility costs are de￿ned as
a fraction of total income, so that the marginal migrant receiving (w + t) in city i will pay
(w + t)m to out-migrate. These mobility cost distributions imply mobility cost functions
cH(￿Hit) and cL(￿Lit), which return the mobility cost of the marginal migrant given the
change in population between the ￿rst and second period. For a smooth distribution of
10mobility costs, the mobility cost function will be strictly decreasing, so that the mobility
cost of the marginal migrant increases as more workers out-migrate.14




indirect utility function for the marginal low-skill worker in city i. Spatial equilibrium in
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Now consider a shock to ￿i in city i. The shock will cause a wage di⁄erential which will
encourage costly migration to arbitrage the wage and employment di⁄erential, and the price
of housing and transfer payments will also adjust as a local general equilibrium response
to the shock. Di⁄erentiating the above spatial equilibrium condition and applying Roy￿ s














L(￿Lit) = 0 (5)
where sL
t (= tL=(wL + tL)) is public assistance income as a share of total income. An









H(￿Hit) = 0 (6)
Equations (5) and (6) are implicit labor supply curves because net migration is determined
by the spatial equilibrium condition for the marginal migrant. In words, the conditions above
state that the change in indirect utility in response to changes in wages, transfer payments,
and housing prices must equal the mobility costs of the marginal migrants. The ￿Lit and
￿Hit terms represent the amount of net migration that needs to occur to make these two
equations hold.
14Note that this two-period model contains two important simpli￿cations which make it straightforward
to study mobility costs. First, following Topel (1986), gross migration will always equal net migration, so
that there is only one marginal migrant per worker type in each city. The work of Artuc, Chaudhari, and
McLauren (2009) and Chaudhari and McLauren (2007) suggest a tractable way to relax this assumption
and allow gross migration ￿ ows to exceed net migration ￿ ows. Second, the mobility cost function is allowed
to be asymmetric, but since this is a two-period model the shape of this function does not depend on the
history of past shocks. In a fully dynamic model, the history of past shocks may a⁄ect the elasticity of
supply of in-migrants and out-migrants.
11These two equations highlight the three reasons discussed in the introduction why net
migration rates may di⁄er by skill. First, public assistance programs are means-tested,
so that sL
t > sH
t . Second, low-skill workers consume a larger fraction of their income on
housing sL
h > sH
h , meaning that housing price declines disproportionately compensate low-
skill workers. Finally, the mobility cost functions may di⁄er by skill. If low-skill workers
typically face higher mobility costs following a negative shock, then cL(x) > cH(x) 8x < 0.
2.5 Equilibrium
Following an exogenous shock to local labor demand (￿￿it), the new equilibrium of the model
is de￿ned by the following conditions:
￿ Labor demand adjusts so that high-skill and low-skill wages equal marginal products
(equations (1) and (2)).
￿ Transfer payments adjust according to changes in low-skill wages (equation (3)).
￿ Housing prices adjust so that the change in housing demand equals the change in
housing supply (equation (4)).
￿ Population adjusts so that the marginal high-skill and low-skill migrant is indi⁄erent
between staying and leaving (equations (5) and (6)).
Although the nonlinearities in the housing supply curve (￿HS(￿ph
it)) and the mobil-
ity cost functions (cH(￿Hit) and cL(￿Lit)) preclude analytical solutions without particular
functional form assumptions, Section A.2 in the Online Appendix derives comparative sta-
tics for speci￿c scenarios under the special case of constant returns to scale of production
(￿ = 1).
Figure 3 reports results from simulating the model.15 The ￿gure shows that if population
responds asymmetrically, it suggests the existence of a concave housing supply curve and/or
the existence of heterogeneous mobility costs. The responsiveness of housing prices isolates
the importance of heterogeneous mobility costs, since mobility costs cause immobile workers
to bid up the price of housing during negative shocks, causing housing prices to respond
15The details of the simulation are given in Section A.3 in the Online Appendix.
12asymmetrically. Therefore, the model suggests that it is possible to identify both mobility
costs and the shape of the housing supply curve by using information on the joint responses
of wages, population, housing prices, and transfer payments to exogenous labor demand
shocks.
These simulations motivate the two-part empirical strategy below. First, I will estimate
nonlinear reduced form regressions to test for asymmetric responses to labor demand shocks.
Second, I will carry out a full estimation of the model to recover the parameters which govern
the distribution of mobility costs and the shape of the housing supply curve.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data
As the model makes clear, the reduced form relationships between each of the endogenous
variables (￿wH, ￿wL, ￿H, ￿L, ￿ph, ￿tL) and the labor demand shock ￿￿ are informative
about the shape of housing supply curve and the presence of heterogeneous mobility costs.
This motivates the following reduced form estimating equation:
￿xit = g
x(￿￿it) + ￿t + ￿"it
where i indexes cities, t indexes time periods, x is one of the endogenous variables above, ￿t
captures proportional shocks to all cities in a given time period, "it is an error term, and g() is
a function to be estimated. Nonparametric estimates of g() are reported graphically below.
In addition to the nonparametric estimates, I also parameterize gx(￿￿) as ￿(￿￿) + ￿(￿￿)2
which leads to the following baseline reduced form empirical speci￿cation that is reported in
the tables:
￿xit = ￿ ￿ ￿￿it + ￿ ￿ (￿￿it)
2 + ￿t + "it (7)
where x is the endogenous variable of interest, ￿ and ￿ are the coe¢ cients on a quadratic
in ￿￿it, and ￿t are year ￿xed e⁄ects. This reduced form speci￿cation is estimated by OLS
using a proxy for local labor demand (described below). The quadratic speci￿cation allows
the elasticity of xit with respect to ￿it to vary: speci￿cally, the elasticity at ￿￿i;t = 0 is
given by ^ ￿, while ^ ￿ + 2^ ￿￿￿it is the elasticity at ￿￿it. Since the equation is estimated in
￿rst di⁄erences it implicitly controls for time-invariant di⁄erences across geographic areas,
13while the inclusion of year ￿xed e⁄ects captures any (proportional) changes in xit common
to all cities. Formally, the statistical test of ￿ 6= 0 is su¢ cient to establish that positive
and negative shifts in labor demand of equal magnitude have unequal e⁄ects. However, this
test is evaluating the null hypothesis of a linear relationship against a speci￿c parametric
alternative. Therefore, I will also report nonparametric speci￿cation tests which test the null
hypothesis of a linear relationship against a nonparametric alternative (Ellison and Ellison,
2000).
Lastly, I also estimate the full model developed above to recover ￿ exible estimates of
the mobility cost functions of high-skill and low-skill workers and the housing supply curve
parameters. The estimation is a nonlinear, simultaneous equations problem, and it is
implemented using a two-step GMM estimator. The details of the GMM procedure are
described in more detail below.
3.1 An Omnibus Instrumental Variable for Local Labor Demand
In order to estimate equation (7) above, a valid instrumental variable for local labor demand
is needed. I follow the empirical strategy of Bartik (1991) and construct a measure of
plausibly exogenous labor demand shocks derived by interacting cross-sectional di⁄erences in
industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.16 This relative
demand index can be used to predict changes in wages and employment. The identifying
assumption is that changes in industry shares at the national level are uncorrelated with
city-level labor supply shocks and therefore represent plausibly exogenous (demand-induced)
variation in metropolitan area employment. This predicted employment variable ( ^ Eit) is
used to create a predicted change in local area employment (￿^ ￿it) as follows: ￿^ ￿i;t = ( ^ Eit ￿
Ei;t￿￿)=Ei;t￿￿. This measure is used as a proxy for ￿￿it.17
The key identifying assumption is that this proxy is uncorrelated with unobserved shocks
16See Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and Holzer (2000), Autor and Duggan (2002), and Luttmer
(2005) for other applications of this instrumental variable.









^ Eit = (1 + ￿i;t)Ei;t￿￿
￿^ ￿it = ( ^ Eit ￿ Ei;t￿￿)=Ei;t￿￿
14to local labor supply. In this paper a stronger assumption is also needed ￿speci￿cally, I must
assume that ￿￿i;t = X and ￿￿i;t = ￿X represent shifts in local labor demand of plausibly
equal magnitude. This requirement gives a clear advantage to the Bartik procedure over
other identi￿able shocks to local labor demand, as this instrumental variable is an omnibus
measure of changes in local labor demand. By contrast, if one were to use identi￿able shifts to
labor demand such as movements in oil prices, coal prices, or other natural resource shocks it
would require that equal-sized positive and negative price changes represent equal-sized shifts
in local labor demand. This may be di¢ cult to justify in natural resource industries that are
typically characterized by high amounts of speci￿c capital and/or irreversible investments.
A related bene￿t of the Bartik procedure is that subsets of industries can be excluded when
constructing the instrumental variable to verify that the results are not driven by particular
sectors.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data sources are brie￿ y described here. The Data Appendix (Online Appendix Section
A.1) gives more detail on how the data set was created.
Census Integrated Public Use Microsamples (IPUMS) The basic panel of metropol-
itan area data comes from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census individual-level and household-
level extracts from the IPUMS database (Ruggles et al., 2004).18 The baseline data are
limited to individuals and households living in metropolitan areas. The IPUMS data are
used to construct estimates of local area wages, employment, population, housing prices, and
rental prices in each metropolitan area. The primary advantage of the Census data is the
ability to construct city-level measures disaggregated by skill. These data are also used to
construct the predicted labor demand instrumental variable by using the industry categories
of the individuals in the labor force. See the Data Appendix for remaining details.
Regional Economic Information System (REIS) The metropolitan-area measures
of expenditures on public assistance programs are computed by aggregating the county-
level aggregate data in the REIS. The REIS contains annual county-level data on total
where ’i;k;t￿￿ is the employment share of industry k in city i and ￿￿i;k;t is the national employment share
of industry k excluding city i.
18The 2007 American Community Survey (ACS) is included as a robustness check. The 1970 Census is
not used at all because it identi￿es only a small subset of the MSAs that appear in later years.
15expenditures broken down by transfer program (e.g., food stamps, income maintenance pro-
grams, public medical bene￿ts, veterans bene￿ts, SSI bene￿ts). Counties are aggregated
into metropolitan areas using the 1990 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) de￿nitions. Be-
cause of the di¢ culty in aggregating counties into MSAs within Alaska and Virginia during
this time period, MSAs in these states are dropped from the baseline sample. Though the
data are not disaggregated below the county-level, the data are based on government agency
reports and are therefore quite reliable. According to recent work by Meyer, Mok, and
Sullivan (2009), aggregate expenditure data may be sometimes preferable to individual or
household survey data due to substantial underreporting in the latter.19 All transfer pro-
gram measures are adjusted per low-skill capita based on the non-college adult population.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the ￿nal data set.
4 Results
4.1 Graphical Evidence
Figures 4 and 5 report nonparametric reduced form estimates for the primary dependent
variables. In addition to the nonparametric estimates, linear estimates are graphed for
comparison. The ￿gures also display bootstrapped (uniform) 95% con￿dence intervals.20
The con￿dence intervals are very wide at the extremes, making it di¢ cult to reject the null
hypothesis that the data are described by any linear relationship. However, in some cases the
con￿dence intervals reject the speci￿c linear relationship estimated using a parametric linear
model, though this visual test ignores estimation error in the linear model. Consequently,
the nonparametric speci￿cation tests reported below will be useful in assessing whether the
data reject the null hypothesis that the parametric linear model is appropriate.21
19Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009) ￿nd substantial underreporting of bene￿t receipt in a wide range of
data sets, including the CPS, PSID, SIPP, PSID, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey for a wide range
of transfer programs. They also document that the under-reporting is not consistent over time.
20The bootstrapped con￿dence intervals are computed based on 10,000 replications, where MSAs are sam-
pled with replacement. In each bootstrap step, an undersmoothed local linear bandwidth is chosen following
Hall (1992). That paper reports Monte Carlo results which suggest that undersmoothing produces con￿-
dence interval estimates with greater coverage accuracy than con￿dence intervals obtained by explicit bias
correction. The bandwidth of the Epanechnikov kernel used for point estimation is 0:041; the undersmoothed
kernel bandwidth is 0:75 ￿ 0:041 = 0:031.
21In all ￿gures, the nonparametric estimates are local linear regressions. The nonparametric reduced form
estimates are also constrained to be monotonic following the rearrangement procedure of Chernozhukov,
16Overall, across all of the graphs the only clear evidence of an asymmetric response is
for employment and population. The population and employment graphs show a convex
relationship with the labor demand instrumental variable. By contrast, there is no evidence
of a similar asymmetric relationship for housing values, rental prices, or any measure of wages
(wage measures are de￿ned below). As shown by the simulated data in Figure 3, these results
are consistent with a concave housing supply curve and limited mobility costs. In order to
formally test for the existence of an asymmetric response (and measure the magnitude of the
asymmetry when it exists), the next subsection reports results from quadratic speci￿cations
and nonparametric speci￿cation tests.
4.2 Reduced Form Results
This section reports estimates of equation (7) above to investigate the responsiveness of
wages, employment, and population to changes in local labor demand. The baseline reduced
form estimating equation is reproduced below:
￿xit = ￿ ￿ ￿^ ￿it + ￿ ￿ (￿^ ￿it)
2 + ￿t + ￿"i;t
The baseline results are reported in Tables 2 through 4. Table 2 presents results for
overall population, employment, and wages. Column (1) shows the results for the total
population between the ages of 18 and 64.22 The estimate of ￿ is precise and strongly
statistically signi￿cant (p < 0:001), which veri￿es that the measure of predicted employ-
ment changes strongly predicts actual shifts in local population. The estimate of ￿ is also
economically and statistically signi￿cant (^ ￿ = 28:010, s.e. 7:905). One way to interpret
the magnitude of this estimate is to calculate the marginal e⁄ect at one standard deviation
greater than zero and one standard deviation less than zero; these estimates are ￿0:152
and 3:757, respectively, and the di⁄erence between these estimates is strongly statistically
signi￿cant (p < 0:001).23 Additionally, a nonparametric speci￿cation test strongly rejects
Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2003). The rearranged estimates are more e¢ cient under the null hypothesis
that the true relationship is (weakly) monotonic. In general, the unconstrained nonparametric estimates
are very similar.
22Results using the population between the ages of 25 and 54 are very similar.
23Note that the p-value for the test of whether the marginal e⁄ects are the same at one standard deviation
above and below zero is exactly the same as the p-value for the test of whether the quadratic term is
17the null hypothesis that the relationship is linear in favor of a nonparametric alternative
(p < 0:001).24 In other words, the results in this column suggest that positive changes in
local labor demand increase population more than negative changes reduce population. The
results for employment in column (2) show evidence of a similar convex relationship. The
results in column (3) using the percentage point change in the employment-to-population
ratio show that not all of the reduction in local employment from an adverse shock comes
from net out-migration; there is also a decline in labor force participation.
The remaining columns of Table 2 explore the consequences of local labor demand shifts
on wages. There are (at least) two di¢ culties in constructing an appropriate wage measure.
The ￿rst di¢ culty is that the labor demand shock may induce compositional changes in
the population, so that the change in the average wage will be confounded by composition
e⁄ects. The second di¢ culty is that changes in labor force participation reduce income per
adult, but would be excluded using a measure of average wages based only on employed
workers.
I approach these problems by ￿rst presenting two measures of changes in wage income
which should represent upper and lower bounds of the true change in income holding char-
acteristics of the workers ￿xed. The ￿rst measure (following Bound and Holzer (2000))
is the total wage income per 18-64 adult. This measure will account for demand-induced
changes in labor force participation but will also include compositional changes. The results
are in column (4) and show a large e⁄ect of local labor demand on wages (^ ￿ = 0:959, s.e.
0:137). The second measure (following Shapiro (2003) and Albouy (2009a, 2009b)) uses
the individual-level census data and regresses log wages of employed workers on a large set
of controls and MSA ￿xed e⁄ects (see Data Appendix for details). The MSA ￿xed e⁄ect
estimated from this regression is a composition-adjusted measure of the wage premium which
I de￿ne as the ￿residualized wage￿ .25 The results in column (5) using this measure show
statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
24I use the nonparametric speci￿cation test procedure suggested by Ellison and Ellison (2000), which
groups the data into ￿bins￿ and creates a test statistic that is asymptotically distributed as a standard
normal random variable. To my knowledge, there is a not a data-driven procedure to select the proper bin
width; therefore, I view the nonparametric speci￿cation test as complementary to the quadratic speci￿cation.
While the nonparametric speci￿cation test does not rely on a speci￿c parametric alternative, it is not possible
to ensure that I have the right size and power in constructing my statistical tests. In almost all of the results
that follow, inference based on the quadratic speci￿cation and the nonparametric speci￿cation test is similar.
25This measure is similar to the local wage premiums calculated in Shapiro (2003) and Albouy (2009a,
18a much smaller wage response (^ ￿ = 0:353, s.e. 0:086). However, this second measure does
not account for changes in labor force participation. Assuming that at least some of the
observed change in labor force participation is involuntary, then this measure will understate
the total e⁄ect of the demand shock. To address this concern, I take the residualized wage
measure and multiply it by the observed labor force participation rate.26 I call this the ￿ad-
justed wage￿and use this as the preferred wage measure. This measure accounts for both
compositional changes in the labor force in response to the shock as well as changes in labor
force participation, and therefore essentially assumes that reservation wages are negligible.
Consequently, I expect this measure to provide an overestimate of mobility costs when I ulti-
mately estimate the full model via GMM. As a way of bounding the estimated magnitude of
mobility costs, I also report GMM estimates which use the residualized wage instead of the
adjusted wage. The residualized wage will give a lower bound on the estimated magnitude
of mobility costs, as it assumes reservation wages are approximately equal to accepted wages
for all employed workers.
As expected, the magnitude of the e⁄ect of local labor demand for adjusted wages lies
in between the other two wage measures (^ ￿ = 0:520, s.e. 0:109). Since the magnitude of
changes in labor force participation is modest, the estimates for adjusted wages are closer to
the estimates for residualized wages than the estimates using the per capita income measure.
Regardless of the measure of wages used, however, the important conclusion that emerges
from columns (4) through (6) is that there is no evidence of an asymmetric response of wages
to shifts in local labor demand in any of the wage measures. It is only population and local
employment which respond asymmetrically.
Table 3 reports results on population, employment and wages separately for high-skill
and low-skill workers. I de￿ne low-skill workers as those without a college degree, and
high-skill workers as those with at least a college degree. The patterns in Table 2 are
reproduced when looking separately within each skill group: population and employment
respond asymmetrically, and there is no evidence of a similar asymmetric response for either
2009b). This measure does not control for unobservable changes in the composition of labor force. If
unobservable changes in composition of labor force move in the same direction as observable changes, then
the measured response of wages will be upward biased, and estimates of mobility costs will be conservative.
26Note that when I present results by skill below, I use the labor force participation rate in the given skill
group to adjust the residualized wage measure.
19high-skill or low-skill wages. Furthermore, the magnitude of the wage e⁄ects are similar
across high-skill and low-skill workers, consistent with the assumption that the labor demand
shifts are factor-neutral.27 Additionally, columns (5) and (6) show that the skill composition
of the adult population and labor force also responds asymmetrically. In other words,
negative shocks reduce college share of adult population more than positive shocks increase
college share.
Next, Table 4 looks at three important non-labor outcomes: real estate rental prices,
housing values, and aggregate expenditures on public assistance programs. The measures
of average rental prices and housing values are purged of observable changes in the quality
of the housing stock following a similar procedure to the one used to create the residualized
wage measure (see Data Appendix for details). Column (1) in Table 4 reports results for
rental prices, which respond strongly to local labor demand. The results for housing values
in column (2) are similar in magnitude, though somewhat less precise. As with the wage
results, there is no evidence of an asymmetric response in either column; the estimates of
￿ are statistically insigni￿cant and at most modest in magnitude, and the nonparametric
speci￿cation tests fail to reject the parametric (linear) model in both columns.28 Appendix
Table A2 reports similar results using the unconditional average rental prices and average
housing values, as well as results using the repeated-sales housing price index (HPI) published
by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), formerly the O¢ ce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). Consistent with the results in Table 4, there is no evidence
of an asymmetric response in any of these alternative speci￿cations.
Lastly, column (3) reports estimates using aggregate expenditures on Food Stamps and
Income Maintenance Programs. The results show that expenditures on these programs
respond strongly to local labor market conditions. The estimated magnitude of the response
is large (^ ￿ = ￿2:367) and implies that a 1% decline in local labor demand increases aggregate
expenditures on these two programs by 2:4%. Though the quadratic term is marginally
signi￿cant (p = 0:074), the nonparametric test does not reject the linear model (p = 0:241),
27Results from stacked regressions do reject that the average wage response for high-skill workers is the
same as the average wage response for low-skill workers (p = 0:523).
28Additionally, results from stacked regressions reject that the quadratic terms are the same for population
and rental prices (p = 0:0004) and reject that the quadratic terms are the same for population and housing
values (p = 0:001).
20suggesting that the nonlinear relationship estimated in the quadratic speci￿cation is not
robust.29
A setting in which population and employment respond asymmetrically to positive and
negative labor demand shocks while wages, rental prices, and housing values respond sym-
metrically is consistent with the model simulation where mobility costs are limited and the
housing supply curve is concave. Before moving beyond this qualitative conclusion to quan-
titative estimates of mobility costs and housing supply curve parameters, I next document
that these reduced form results are not driven by unobserved trends, outliers, sample selec-
tion, or heterogeneous industry-speci￿c e⁄ects. After that, I conclude by estimating the full
model above using a nonlinear GMM estimator.
5 Robustness
5.1 Industry Trends
The main results in Table 2 emphasize the importance of asymmetric employment and
population responses to local labor demand shocks, and the absence of a similar asymmetric
response for wages, housing prices, and transfer payments. The key identifying assumption
in interpreting these results is that equally-sized positive and negative predicted changes
in local employment represent shifts in local labor demand of plausibly equal magnitude.
Because the predicted changes are formed by interacting cross-sectional variation in industrial
composition with national changes in industry shares, an obvious concern is that qualitatively
di⁄erent industries are declining and expanding. If these industries would not be expected
to have otherwise identical responses to shifts in local labor demand (perhaps because of
di⁄erences in relative demand for high-skill labor, the amount of speci￿c human capital in
the industry, or the ability of ￿rms in the industry to respond and adjust to shocks), then
this would cast doubt on the interpretation of the results as tracing out an asymmetric local
labor supply curve.
To investigate this concern, I categorize industries based on their decadal changes in total
29Appendix Table A3 reports estimates for various other transfer programs, including Medicare, Disability
Bene￿ts, SSI, and Veterans Bene￿ts, and the results are qualitatively similar. I focus on Food Stamps and
Income Maintenance income because these programs are explicitly designed to smooth consumption.
21national employment. Industries are grouped into one of four categories:
1. Persistently expanding/declining industries. Industries where employment either in-
creased in every decade or decreased in every decade.
2. Stable industries. Industries where employment did not increase or decrease more
than 20% in any of the decades.30
3. Volatile industries. Industries that experienced employment growth of more than 20%
and decreases of more than 20% during the sample period.
4. Other industries. Industries not otherwise categorized.
The top twenty industries according to average national employment share in each of
these categories are listed in Appendix Table A1. The industries in each of the categories
conform to expectations given the secular industry trends during this time period. Persis-
tently expanding industries are concentrated in services, health care, data processing, and
leisure goods, while persistently contracting industries are in apparel, publishing, manufac-
turing, and tobacco. Volatile industries include natural resource industries such as oil and
gas extraction as well as defense industries. I begin by constructing predicted employment
excluding variation in national employment shares for industries that are persistently ex-
panding or persistently declining.31 The resulting relative demand index is purged of any
variation caused by secular trends in health care, services, and manufacturing. Table 5
reports results from estimating equation (7) using this alternative measure of predicted em-
ployment as an instrumental variable for local labor demand. Panel A reports results with
the change in adult population as the dependent variable. Column (1) reproduces the results
from column (1) in Table 2 for comparison. Column (2) reports results using the predicted
employment measure that does not use any variation from industries which are persistently
30If industries are classi￿ed as both persistently expanding/declining and stable, I categorize the industry
as stable. This de￿nition and the cuto⁄ of 20% were chosen to give roughly equal-sized categories. Results
are similar with nearby cuto⁄s.











where K is the set of all industries and K0 is the set of industries which pass the ￿lter.
22expanding or persistently declining. The point estimates in column (2) are fairly similar to
the baseline estimates reproduced in column (1). Columns (3) through (5) report results
excluding each of the other industry categories when constructing predicted employment,
and the results are also quite similar to the baseline results in column (1). I interpret these
results as suggesting that the estimated asymmetric population response is not primarily
caused by heterogeneous industry-speci￿c e⁄ects.
A related concern is that because of the way that the IPUMS creates consistent industry
codes across time, there are ￿catch-all￿industry codes that collect industries which are not
otherwise categorized. I label an industry code a catch-all industry code if it contains the
word ￿miscellaneous￿or contains the su¢ x ￿not elsewhere categorized.￿ These catch-all
industry codes make up roughly 10% of the industry codes. These catch-all categories may
represent di⁄erent collections of industries in di⁄erent decades, which may bias the main
estimates. To investigate this concern, I create an alternative measure of predicted employ-
ment which does not use any variation in national employment shares of these industries.
The estimates using this predicted employment measure are reported in column (6) and are
similar to the results in column (1), suggesting that there is no signi￿cant bias from including
these catch-all categories.
Panels B and C of Table 5 report results which repeat this exercise using adjusted wages
and rental prices as the dependent variables, respectively. Consistent with the baseline
results in Tables 2 and 4, none of the estimates in any of the columns show evidence of an
asymmetric relationship between adjusted wages or rental prices and labor demand.32
5.2 Alternative Speci￿cations
I next turn to an investigation of the robustness of the main results by reporting alternative
speci￿cations which vary the sample de￿nition and the set of time-varying controls used.
The purpose of these speci￿cations is primarily to investigate the possibility of sample se-
lection bias and the potential bias from unobserved trends that are correlated with shifts in
local labor demand. As with Table 5, Table 6 reports results using population, adjusted
32Interestingly, the magnitude of the (linear) response of adjusted wages and rental prices to local labor
demand varies somewhat depending on the industries used to generate predicted changes in employment,
suggesting that the strength of the proxy for local labor demand may vary depending on the set of industries
used to generate the proxy.
23wages, and rental prices (respectively) as the dependent variables in each of the panels. All
columns report results from estimating variants of equation (7). In all panels, column (1)
reports the baseline results for comparison. Column (2) reports results from adding data on
the 2000-2007 changes.33 Column (3) creates ￿pseudo-MSAs￿by grouping together all indi-
viduals in a state who are not in an MSA. Column (4) reports long-di⁄erence results (using
the 1980-2000 change) rather than the stacked decadal changes as in the baseline speci￿ca-
tion. Columns (5) and (6) report results including alternative sets of geographic and time
￿xed e⁄ects. Column (5) includes region ￿xed e⁄ects for each of the nine census regions
which control for region-speci￿c linear time trends, while column (6) includes controls for
MSA-speci￿c linear time trends. Column (7) reports results which test for the importance
of outliers. This column drops the 5% of the data with the largest magnitude changes in
local labor demand. Finally, column (8) uses the County Business Patterns (CBP) data
set to construct the local labor demand instrument rather than using Census data (see Data
Appendix for details). The CBP data contain ￿ner industry categories, which in principle
could reduce measurement error, but there are two primary drawbacks: ￿rst, there is a high
rate of suppressed data at the county-by-industry level, and, second, the county-level data
must be aggregated.
Panel A of Table 6 reports results using population as the dependent variable. Across all
of the columns, the point estimates are very similar to the baseline speci￿cation in column (1).
The results in column (6) which include MSA-speci￿c linear time trends show a substantial
loss of precision, but the point estimates remain stable. The results in column (7) show that
the estimated asymmetric response is robust to dropping outlying observations, suggesting
that the convex population response is not primarily driven by outliers. The results in
column (8) show the results are similar using CBP data to construct the labor demand
instrument.
Panels B and C of Table 6 report results using adjusted wages and rental prices (respec-
tively) as the dependent variables. The estimates of ￿ are never statistically signi￿cant at
conventional levels, nor are even consistently the same sign across columns. In other words,
there is no consistent evidence of an asymmetric response of adjusted wages or rental prices
33The 2000-2007 changes are translated into implied decadal changes by ￿rst calculating annual percentage
changes.
24to local labor demand shocks.
Lastly, Appendix Table A4 reports speci￿cations which drop each one (of nine) census
regions. This table con￿rms that the results do not appear to be driven by any particular
region.
In summary, the reduced form patterns of a signi￿cant asymmetric response of population
and employment to changes in local labor demand appear robust and contrast sharply with
a lack of similar asymmetric responses for wages, housing values, and rental prices.
6 GMM Estimates
The reduced form results presented above directly test for the existence of asymmetric re-
sponses of wages, population, employment, and housing prices to symmetric labor demand
shocks. While revealing, these results do not estimate any of the economic parameters in the
theoretical model and are therefore not quantitatively informative about the distribution of
mobility costs by skill and the actual incidence of labor demand shocks. This section reports
results from a joint estimation of the full model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations
GMM estimator. The econometric setup follows from the theoretical model presented above
and imposes moment conditions which can be used to identify the parameters of interest.
In particular, the GMM estimator can recover ￿ exible estimates of the housing supply curve
and mobility cost functions for high-skill and low-skill workers. These estimates can be used
to assess the relative importance of housing expenditures, transfer payments, and mobility
costs in generating the observed migration patterns in the data. Additionally, because I
parameterize the model so that there are more moment conditions than (remaining) para-
meters to estimate, the GMM estimator admits a chi-squared overidenti￿cation test of the
full model.
To implement the GMM estimator, the following equations (derived from equations (1)






























































where i indexes cities, t indexes time, and ￿e
j
it represent error terms uncorrelated with shifts
in labor demand.34 These equations jointly solve the local general equilibrium problem of
how wages, employment, housing prices, and transfer payments respond to an exogenous




￿Hit, ￿Lit, and ￿tL
it. Note that the error terms are allowed to be freely correlated with
each other, which gives rise to simultaneity bias that the GMM estimator is intended to
address. The unknowns in the model are the following parameters and functions:




￿ Aggregate share parameters (￿, ￿)
￿ Labor demand parameters (￿, ￿, ￿, ￿)
￿ Transfer payment elasticity (￿)
￿ Mobility cost functions (cL(￿) and cH(￿))
￿ Housing supply function (￿Hs(￿))
34Each of these equations can be derived formally by including error terms which proportionally shift
production, housing demand, housing supply, transfer payments, and indirect utility. For example, re-de￿ne
the equilibrium condition for transfer payments as follows: tL
it = et






it is a random
variable which represents unobservable shocks to transfer payment expenditures (and E[et] = 1). Totally
di⁄erentiating this condition gives the following expression: ￿tL





it, which is the equation
used in the GMM estimation.




h based on external information. I compute sL
t = 0:05 by dividing aggregate expenditures
on Food Stamps and Income Maintenance Programs by the sum of these expenditures and
aggregate low-skill wage income. For the housing expenditure shares, I use sL
h = 0:34 for
non-college households and sH
h = 0:30 for college-educated households based on the data
presented in Section 2.35
For the labor demand curve, I compute ￿ = 0:37 based on average wages for high-skill
and low-skill workers and average share of high-skill workers in the adult population.36 I
compute ￿ = 0:34 based on the average wages, the skill share, and the housing expenditure
shares from above.37 I choose ￿ = 0:29 based on Katz and Murphy (1992).38 This leaves the
returns to scale parameter (￿) to be estimated. Although this parameter will be estimated
from functional form assumptions, it is still useful to include the two moments of the labor
demand curve to check the overall ￿t of the model.39 I also report results below which drop
the labor demand moments.40
Finally, I choose the following functional forms for the mobility cost functions and housing
35Average household income is $82,439 for high-skill households in the baseline sample and is $48,456
for low-skill households. Assuming sh = 0:30 for high-skill households and income elasticity of 0:8, then
sh = 0:34 for low-skill households.
36I compute the wage premium (￿) as 1:75, which is the average wages of college-educated workers divided
by the average wages of non-college workers. I next compute the average share (over this time period) of
college-educated workers in the labor force (￿) as 0:25. Using the formula for ￿ in Section 2, this gives
￿ = 0:37.




38Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor
(￿H;L) to be 1:4. This gives ￿ = 1 ￿ 1=￿H;L = 0:29.
39Since the instrumental variable shifts the labor demand curve, parameters of the labor demand curve
itself are identi￿ed from functional form assumptions.
40Because the labor demand instrument is measured with error, when using it in the GMM estimation, I
rescale it by regressing adjusted wages on the instrument and scale the instrument so that this regression
with the rescaled instrument would give a coe¢ cient of 1:0. A more rigorous alternative is to modify the
labor demand moments to include an additional parameter (￿) as follows:
￿ewH
it = ￿wH
it ￿ (￿￿￿it + ((￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿))￿Hit + (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿Lit)
￿ewL
it = ￿wL
it ￿ (￿￿￿it + ((￿ ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))￿Lit + (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿)￿Hit)














These functions are the exponential transformations suggested by Manly (1976), which
represent Box-Cox transformations of exponentiated variables and are de￿ned so that if ￿
j =
0, then the functions simplify to ￿jx. These functions are ￿ exible enough to accommodate
interesting curvature with only two parameters, and they are everywhere monotonic and have
continuous ￿rst derivatives, which greatly simpli￿es the computation. Ultimately, there are
eight remaining parameters to estimate f￿h, ￿
h, ￿L, ￿
L, ￿H, ￿
H, ￿, ￿g: two housing supply
curve parameters (￿h, ￿
h), two low-skill mobility cost parameters (￿L, ￿
L), two high-skill
mobility cost parameters (￿H, ￿
H), the responsiveness of transfer payments to low-skill wages
(￿), and the returns to scale parameter (￿).
The resulting GMM estimator solves a nonlinear, simultaneous equations problem, so
in order to estimate the nonlinear parameters I need to take nonlinear functions of the
instrumental variable (￿￿) to achieve identi￿cation. I use ￿￿, (￿￿)2, (￿￿)3, (￿￿)4, and
(￿￿)5 as instrumental variables.41 This results in 30 moment conditions (the ￿ve polynomial
functions of the instrument ￿ the six error terms). The full model is estimated using a
standard two-step GMM procedure (see Section A.5 of the Online Appendix for details of
this procedure).
The GMM estimates are presented in Table 7. The ￿rst row presents the preferred
speci￿cation using the external estimates discussed above. Columns (1) and (2) report
estimates of the housing supply curve. The estimates suggest that the housing supply curve
is concave (￿
h = 6:306, s.e. 1:774). One way to interpret the housing supply coe¢ cients
is to compute the increase in housing supply when housing prices exogenously rise by 20%
(24:1%) and compare it to the decrease in housing supply when housing prices decline by
20% (￿6:8%). In other words, the magnitude of housing supply response is about four times
larger for an increase in housing prices than for an equal-sized decrease in housing prices.
41Instead of using simple polynomial functions, I have experimented with various orthogonal polynomials
(Chebyshev polynomials, Legendre polynomials, and Hermite polynomials), and the results are very similar.
28The estimates of the mobility cost function parameters (columns (3) through (6)) give
no evidence of an asymmetric mobility cost function for either high-skill or low-skill work-
ers; the estimates suggest that the mobility cost functions are approximately linear. The
point estimates for ￿L and ￿H are precisely estimated and statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero, suggesting the existence of non-negligible mobility costs. To get a sense of the
magnitudes, the point estimates imply that the 10th percentile of mobility costs in a city
(i.e., the marginal migrant after 10% of the population has out-migrated following a neg-
ative shock) is roughly 17:4% of annual income for high-skill workers and 17:0% of annual
income for low-skill workers.42 In other words, despite the fact that low-skill workers are
disproportionately likely to remain in declining cities following negative shocks, the point
estimates imply that high-skill workers have very similar mobility costs as a fraction of in-
come (and therefore that low-skill workers have lower absolute mobility costs on average).
Column (8) reports the estimated transfer payment elasticity, which is quantitatively large
and precisely estimated; the coe¢ cient implies that a 1% decline in low-skill wages increases
transfer payment expenditures by 3:8% (s.e. 0:5%). Column (9) reports estimates of the
returns to scale parameter (￿ = 1:038, s.e. 0:025), which suggests that returns to scale are
approximately constant; this is also consistent with the reduced form results, which found
no evidence of an asymmetric response of wages.43 Lastly, the results in column (10) show
that the overidenti￿cation test does not reject the null hypothesis that the deviations of the
empirical moments from the model are due to chance (p = 0:515).
The remainder of Table 7 reports estimates of the full model under alternative economic
assumptions. The second row reports estimates assuming that both housing expenditure
share and public assistance expenditures do not di⁄er by skill and are negligible (i.e., sH
h =
sL
h = 10￿6 and sH
t = sL
t = 10￿6). These estimates verify that ignoring the welfare e⁄ects
of housing price adjustments and changes in expenditures on public assistance programs
results in much larger estimates of mobility costs for both high-skill and low-skill workers.
In this scenario, the mobility cost estimates for low-skill workers are signi￿cantly larger
42I assume the marginal migrant has 25 years of working life remaining and thus must trade o⁄ remaining
to face permanently lower wage and employment opportunities against paying the one-time mobility cost to
out-migrate and avoid the adverse wage and employment consequences.
43Wages did not respond asymmetrically but population and employment did, which suggests constant
returns to scale. If there were decreasing returns to scale, then the asymmetric response of employment to
the local labor demand shock would imply an asymmetric wage response, as well.
29in magnitude (￿L = ￿0:201 versus ￿H = ￿0:107). Also, the di⁄erence between these
coe¢ cients is highly signi￿cant (p < 0:001). To compare to the baseline estimates, the
mobility costs are roughly three times larger for low-skill workers and two times larger for
high-skill workers when ignoring housing costs and transfer payments.44
The third and fourth rows report model estimates when only housing and only transfers
are ￿shut down￿ , respectively. The estimated mobility cost functions from these rows and
the ￿rst two rows are graphed in Figure 6. Both the ￿gure and the model estimates (see
column (9)) suggest that transfer payments are responsible for a majority of the relative
di⁄erence in mobility by skill. However, the magnitudes of mobility cost estimates are much
larger for both types of workers when housing expenditures are ignored. In other words, the
asymmetric population response for both high-skill and low-skill workers is primarily due to
the asymmetric housing supply curve, while the di⁄erential response by skill is primarily due
to transfer payments.
The ￿fth row assumes the demand for housing is homothetic so that the housing expen-
diture shares are the same across the two skill groups. I choose sL
h = sH
h = 0:33 to match
the average housing expenditure share across the entire population. The results are fairly
similar to the baseline results in the ￿rst row, implying that the non-homotheticity assumed
in the baseline model does not substantially account for the di⁄erential out-migration rates
by skill.
Rows 6 and 7 in Table 7 report estimates which impose alternative values of ￿H;L. First,
I impose ￿H;L = 20, which corresponds to the two types of labor being close to perfect
substitutes, and the results are fairly similar. The next row imposes ￿H;L = 0:1, which
corresponds to the two types being close to perfect complements, and the housing supply
curve estimates are much noisier. Interestingly, the ￿t of the model is best when using
￿H;L = 1:4 (row 1) following Katz and Murphy (1992), as opposed using either of the two
extreme values of ￿H;L.
The next row of Table 7 (row 8) uses an alternative measure of wages. As discussed
above, the preferred measure of wages (￿adjusted wages￿ ) assumes that most of the observed
44The estimated mobility cost functions are also statistically signi￿cantly convex, implying that the mo-
bility cost of the marginal out-migrant rises faster than the marginal in-migrant, although the magnitude of
the convexity is not large.
30change in labor force participation is involuntary. This measure was chosen to provide an
upper bound of estimated mobility costs. As an alternative, row 7 reports results using the
￿residualized wage￿measure (see Section 4 for de￿nition). Since residualized wages do not
account for changes in labor force participation, the estimated mobility cost parameters are
much lower. In fact, using this alternative wage measure, I cannot reject the null hypothesis
that mobility costs are zero for low-skill workers. Overall, I conclude that these results
suggest that mobility costs for both high-skill and low-skill workers are at most modest.
Even under the extreme assumption that reservation wages are negligible, the estimated
mobility costs are still much lower than would be implied by focusing solely on wages.45
One use of the GMM estimates is to construct out-of-sample counterfactual simulations
of alternative policies regarding social transfers. Figure 7 reports results from one such
simulation. In this simulation, the system of means-tested transfers (summarized by the
parameter ￿) has been replaced by a system of mobility subsidies which reduces the mobility
costs of all workers by 50%.46 Each panel in the ￿gure shows the response of a di⁄erent
endogenous variable. The ￿gure shows that the mobility subsidies increase magnitude of low-
skill out-migration following adverse shocks relative to the system of means-tested transfer
payments. Therefore, the high-skill population share is much less responsive to shifts in local
labor demand with mobility subsidies. One motivation for such a policy would be if there
exist strong negative externalities from increasing the concentration of low-skill workers in a
particular area; in this case, mobility subsidies appear to provide wage insurance to low-skill
workers without di⁄erentially reducing their incentive to out-migrate.
45The ￿nal row reports estimates which drop the labor demand curve moments. The reason why alter-
native assumptions on the elasticity of substitution did not substantially a⁄ect the estimated mobility cost
functions is that the labor demand moments contribute to identi￿cation only indirectly through the optimal
GMM weighting matrix estimated in the ￿rst step of the two-step procedure. Therefore, it is not surprising
that dropping the labor demand moments entirely does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the estimates of the mobility
cost functions (Table 7, row 8).
46Although this is an obviously stylized form of mobility subsidies, it is not an unrealistic approximation
if the policy took the form of a tax credit that was indexed to income. Recall that mobility costs in the
model are de￿ned as a fraction of annual income.
317 Conclusion
Low-skill workers are comparatively immobile. When labor demand slumps in a city, college-
educated workers tend to relocate whereas non-college workers are disproportionately likely
to remain to face declining wages and employment. These facts may indicate that mobility is
disproportionately costly for low-skill workers. This paper proposes and tests an alternative
explanation, which is that the incidence of adverse labor demand shocks is borne in large
part by (falling) real estate rental prices and (rising) social transfers. The spatial equilib-
rium model developed in this paper illustrates how wages, employment, population, housing
prices, and transfer payments re-equilibrate after a local labor demand shock. Appropriately
parameterized, this model identi￿es both the magnitude of unobserved mobility costs by skill
and the shape of the local housing supply curve.
Using U.S. Census data, nonlinear reduced form estimates of the e⁄ect of plausibly exoge-
nous labor demand shocks document that positive labor demand shocks increase population
more than negative shocks reduce population, that this asymmetry is larger for low-skill
workers, and that such an asymmetry is absent for wages, housing values, and rental prices.
These facts are consistent with the presence of limited mobility costs for high-skill and
low-skill workers and a concave housing supply curve (most likely due to a durable hous-
ing stock). Estimates of a full spatial equilibrium model using a nonlinear, simultaneous
equations GMM estimator are consistent with the reduced form evidence and suggest that
the primary explanation for the comparative immobility of low-skilled workers is not higher
mobility costs per se, but rather a lower incidence of adverse local demand shocks.
The ￿nding that mobility costs are limited for both high-skill and low-skill workers is
a necessary condition to be able to properly interpret changes in housing values due to
changes in observed local amenities as a valid marginal willingness to pay for the amenity
(see, for example, Chay and Greenstone (2003)). The results in this paper suggest that
the assumption of perfect mobility may be a valid approximation in some of these hedonic
studies, especially when evaluating changes in local amenities over decadal time horizons.47
47It is worth stressing that even over decadal time horizons the assumption of perfect mobility is only an
approximation. The preferred GMM estimates in this paper imply non-negligible magnitudes of mobility
costs for both high-skill and low-skill workers following large negative shocks, suggesting that it may be
appropriate to also consider hedonic models which explicitly incorporate barriers to migration when the
underlying changes in local amenities are large. See Bayer et al. (2008) for work in this direction.
32One important area of future work is how the incidence of local labor market shocks is
shared between homeowners and renters. On the one hand, homeowners￿￿user cost￿of
housing has declined following a negative labor demand shock; on the other hand, however,
declines in housing values have a negative wealth e⁄ect which may a⁄ect how responsive the
household is to local labor demand shocks. A full assessment of the incidence of local labor
market shocks thus awaits further study. Another important area of future work is looking
at individual transfer programs. For example, the federal disability insurance program rules
suggest that the take-up decision is generally a once-and-for-all choice, so that disability
insurance receipt is an absorbing state (Autor and Duggan, 2003). The econometric setup
in this paper could be used to test whether positive shifts in local labor demand decrease DI
takeup by less than negative shifts increase DI takeup.
Lastly, the ￿nding that mobility costs are limited suggests that transfer payments may
be signi￿cantly crowding out the individual migration decision for low-skill workers, which
is consistent with the results in the recent ￿welfare magnetism￿literature (see, for example,
Gelbach (2004)). This implies that the social e¢ ciency of public insurance programs may
depend on the geographic breadth of an adverse labor demand shock, since when a shock is
geographically broad (as during a recession), the gains to relocation are small and there is
less scope for transfer payments to crowd out migration.
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36N Mean 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
U.S. Census Data (IPUMS)
Adult population (in millions) 645 0.425 0.856 0.060 0.093 0.177 0.392 1.477
Employment (in millions) 645 0.303 0.596 0.041 0.067 0.127 0.283 1.036
Employment-to-population ratio 645 0.711 0.051 0.625 0.680 0.714 0.748 0.786
Income per adult (in $000s) 645 14.979 3.167 10.516 12.871 14.664 16.674 20.079
Residualized wage ($) 645 11.545 1.207 9.801 10.718 11.399 12.304 13.712
Residualized wage, LFP adjusted ($) 645 8.225 1.131 6.593 7.496 8.142 8.911 10.095
College share of adult population 645 0.190 0.063 0.105 0.143 0.181 0.226 0.305
College share of employment 645 0.221 0.065 0.131 0.173 0.213 0.257 0.341
Average housing value (in $000s) 645 97.449 45.450 58.005 71.527 84.774 107.212 196.809
Average gross rent (in $000s) 645 5.229 1.014 4.055 4.579 5.017 5.581 7.196
REIS Data
645 0.652 0.325 0.247 0.429 0.594 0.792 1.286
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Notes:  Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 215 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), and all observations are MSA-year.  
IPUMS data are the 1980, 1990, and 2000.  The REIS data are county-level and annual, but are aggregated to MSAs using the 1990 
MSA definitions.  All dollar values in this table are nominal, but all dollar-valued variables are converted to real dollars in the 
analysis.  All specifications in subsequent tables are in first differences, so the three decades in this data set become two 10-year 




Food stamps + Income maintenance
(in $000s per non-college adult)
37(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)














% Change in predicted employment      (β) 1.802 2.056 0.089 0.959 0.353 0.520
(0.445) (0.465) (0.038) (0.137) (0.086) (0.109)
   [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.019]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  28.010 32.537 1.210 0.382 -0.756 1.458
(7.905) (9.101) (0.797) (2.859) (1.643) (2.426)
   [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.130]    [0.894]    [0.646]    [0.549]
Marginal effect at −σ   (A) -0.152 -0.214 0.005 0.932 0.405 0.419
    (i.e., β − 2δσ) (0.847) (0.898) (0.055) (0.205) (0.156) (0.174)
[0.858] [0.812] [0.930] [0.000] [0.010] [0.017]
Marginal effect at +σ   (B) 3.757 4.327 0.174 0.985 0.300 0.622
    (i.e., β + 2δσ) (0.535) (0.658) (0.077) (0.274) (0.130) (0.225)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.026] [0.000] [0.022] [0.006]
p-value of test (A) = (B) 0.000 0.000 0.130 0.894 0.646 0.549
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.492 0.628 0.451
R
2 0.315 0.354 0.605 0.670 0.471 0.340
N 430 430 430 430 430 430
Table 2
The Effects of Local Labor Demand Shocks
Notes:  All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7).  Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts.  Final sample is 
a balanced panel of 215 MSAs.  Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods, except for column (3) where it is the percentage 
point change.  The Residualized Wage in column (5) controls for observed compositional changes in the labor force between periods.  The Adjusted 
Wage in column (6) uses the Residualized Wage and additionally accounts for changes in labor force participation.  The % Change in predicted 
employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.  The 
nonparametric specification test tests the null hypothesis that a linear model is appropriate against a nonparametric alternative.  See main text and  
Data Appendix for more details.  All specifications include year fixed effects.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance 
matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.














% Change in predicted empl.      (β) 1.925 1.609 2.196 1.860 0.051 0.039 0.296 0.346 0.467 0.514
(0.544) (0.436) (0.553) (0.457) (0.024) (0.027) (0.080) (0.085) (0.100) (0.107)
   [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.036]    [0.151]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]
(% Change in predicted empl.)
2  (δ)  35.204 28.057 36.980 32.896 -0.816 -1.022 -1.322 -0.829 -0.498 1.525
(10.363) (7.692) (10.993) (8.834) (0.349) (0.376) (1.399) (1.628) (2.011) (2.372)
   [0.001]    [0.000]    [0.001]    [0.000]    [0.020]    [0.007]    [0.346]    [0.611]    [0.805]    [0.521]
Marginal effect at −σ   (A) -0.531 -0.349 -0.384 -0.436 0.108 0.110 0.389 0.404 0.502 0.408
(0.989) (0.844) (0.999) (0.892) (0.033) (0.038) (0.140) (0.153) (0.168) (0.169)
[0.592] [0.679] [0.701] [0.625] [0.001] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.003] [0.017]
Marginal effect at +σ   (B) 4.382 3.566 4.777 4.155 -0.006 -0.032 0.204 0.288 0.432 0.621
(0.812) (0.494) (0.889) (0.619) (0.035) (0.038) (0.110) (0.129) (0.176) (0.222)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.862] [0.397] [0.066] [0.027] [0.015] [0.006]
p-value of test (A) = (B) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.020 0.007 0.346 0.611 0.805 0.521
p-value of nonparam. specification test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.134 0.073 0.621 0.612 0.605 0.428
R
2 0.558 0.240 0.569 0.262 0.772 0.751 0.432 0.659 0.472 0.210
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430
Table 3
Effects of Labor Demand Shocks by Skill
Notes:  All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7).  Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts.  Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs.  
Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods, except in columns (5) and (6) which report percentage point changes in the college share.  The % Change in 
predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.  See Table 2, main text, and 
Data Appendix for more details.  All specifications include year fixed effects.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area 
over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.













% Change in predicted employment      (β) 0.842 0.714 -2.367
(0.151) (0.360) (0.615)
   [0.000]    [0.048]    [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  -0.999 -2.765 -21.779
(2.758) (6.310) (12.139)
   [0.717]    [0.662]    [0.074]
Marginal effect at −σ   (A) 0.912 0.907 -0.847
(0.243) (0.580) (1.030)
[0.000] [0.119] [0.412]
Marginal effect at +σ   (B) 0.773 0.521 -3.887
(0.247) (0.558) (1.064)
[0.002] [0.351] [0.000]
p-value of test (A) = (B) 0.717 0.662 0.074
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.596 0.295 0.241
R
2 0.099 0.144 0.403
N 430 430 430
Table 4
Effects of Labor Demand Shocks on Housing Market 
and Public Assistance Expenditures
Notes:  All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7).  Data come from IPUMS 1980, 
1990, and 2000 census extracts and the REIS database.  The REIS database contains total county-level 
expenditures on Food Stamps and Income Maintenance programs.  These data are aggregated to MSAs 
using 1990 MSA definition and adjusted per non-college capita using MSA population estimates from the 
Census.  Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs.  Dependent variable is always the percentage 
change across periods.  The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional 
differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.  See Table 2, 
main text, and Data Appendix for more details.  All specifications include year fixed effects.  Standard 
errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, 
are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.













% Change in predicted employment      (β) 1.802 3.768 2.170 1.855 1.692 2.196
(0.445) (0.667) (0.538) (0.455) (0.578) (0.545)
   [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.004]    [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  28.010 30.589 35.251 30.662 45.861 43.311
(7.905) (10.665) (13.351) (8.727) (12.455) (13.348)
   [0.000]    [0.005]    [0.009]    [0.001]    [0.000]    [0.001]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.000
% Change in predicted employment      (β) 0.520 1.180 0.388 0.532 0.478 0.687
(0.109) (0.208) (0.131) (0.102) (0.134) (0.126)
   [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.003]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  1.458 2.543 -0.689 1.909 3.325 0.944
(2.426) (4.083) (2.766) (2.274) (3.425) (2.674)
   [0.549]    [0.534]    [0.803]    [0.402]    [0.333]    [0.724]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.451 0.378 0.069 0.211 0.100 0.193
% Change in predicted employment      (β) 0.842 1.328 0.812 0.908 0.727 0.994
(0.151) (0.303) (0.173) (0.152) (0.176) (0.190)
   [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  -0.999 -6.889 -2.104 0.563 1.012 -4.079
(2.758) (5.521) (3.787) (2.964) (3.655) (3.779)
   [0.717]    [0.213]    [0.579]    [0.850]    [0.782]    [0.282]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.596 0.437 0.392 0.556 0.063 0.490
Table 5
Effects of Alternative Measures of Labor Demand Shocks
Panel A: Dependent Variable is % Change in Population
Panel B: Dependent Variable is % Change in Adjusted Wage
Panel C: Dependent Variable is % Change in Rental Prices
Notes:  N = 430.  All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7).  Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, 
and 2000 census extracts.  Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs.  Dependent variable is always the percentage 
change across periods.  The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in 
industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.  Column (1) reproduces the baseline 
specification; remaining columns construct predicted employment changes by excluding alternative sets of industries.  
See Table 2, main text, Appendix Table A1, and Data Appendix for more details.  All specifications include year fixed 
effects.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over 
time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.
Industries Used to Construct Change in Predicted Employment
41(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
% Change in predicted employment      (β) 1.802 1.351 1.821 2.517 1.342 1.368 1.419 0.509
(0.445) (0.309) (0.414) (0.511) (0.547) (0.947) (0.674) (0.360)
   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.015]   [0.150]   [0.036]   [0.158]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  28.010 18.110 24.051 30.163 25.102 32.652 38.327 17.196
(7.905) (3.823) (7.528) (6.297) (7.842) (20.344) (22.388) (6.200)
   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.002]   [0.000]   [0.002]   [0.110]   [0.088]   [0.006]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.015 0.003
% Change in predicted employment      (β) 0.520 1.224 0.432 0.242 0.590 0.896 0.423 0.418
(0.109) (0.542) (0.096) (0.101) (0.102) (0.245) (0.115) (0.091)
   [0.000]   [0.025]   [0.000]   [0.017]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  1.458 8.948 0.925 0.745 0.246 3.840 3.885 2.129
(2.426) (6.080) (2.229) (1.240) (2.256) (4.521) (3.259) (1.316)
   [0.549]   [0.143]   [0.678]   [0.548]   [0.913]   [0.397]   [0.235]   [0.107]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.451 0.475 0.299 0.217 0.584 0.153 0.293 0.363
% Change in predicted employment      (β) 0.842 0.663 0.804 0.791 0.728 0.934 0.821 0.814
(0.151) (0.367) (0.135) (0.134) (0.145) (0.364) (0.173) (0.126)
   [0.000]   [0.073]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.011]   [0.000]   [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  -0.999 -4.675 0.178 -3.422 -2.087 4.120 3.698 1.512
(2.758) (5.530) (2.645) (1.652) (2.546) (5.974) (5.080) (1.948)
   [0.717]   [0.399]   [0.946]   [0.040]   [0.413]   [0.491]   [0.467]   [0.438]
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.596 0.162 0.412 0.136 0.591 0.240 0.317 0.184
Alternative Samples and Alternative Specifications
Baseline sample (N = 430) X X X X X
Add 2000-2007 change (N = 586) X
Add in non-MSA regions of states (N = 528) X
Long differences (N = 215) X
Region-specific linear time trends X
MSA-specific linear time trends X
Drop outlying 5% shocks X
Predicted employment from CBP X
Table 6
Alternative Sample Definitions and Alternative Specifications
Panel A: Dependent Variable is % Change in Population
Panel B: Dependent Variable is % Change in Adjusted Wage
Panel C: Dependent Variable is % Change in Rental Prices
Notes:  All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7).  Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts.  
Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs.  Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods.  The % Change in 
predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry 
employment shares.  Column (1) reproduces the baseline specification; remaining columns construct predicted employment changes 
using subsets of industries.  See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details.  All specifications include year fixed effects.  
Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis 
and p-values are in brackets.
















L ψ α σ
L – σ
H 
(1) Baseline Model 1.201 6.306 -0.066 -1.044 -0.065 -0.861 -3.838 1.038 -0.001 21.088
(0.407) (1.774) (0.016) (0.766) (0.019) (0.738) (0.447) (0.025) (0.015) [0.515]
[0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.174] [0.001] [0.244] [0.000] [0.129] [0.951]
(2) No Housing; No Transfers 1.009 6.472 -0.107 -0.495 -0.201 -0.900 -4.341 1.020 0.093 25.262
(0.432) (2.685) (0.017) (0.408) (0.024) (0.276) (0.577) (0.021) (0.016) [0.285]
[0.020] [0.016] [0.000] [0.226] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.336] [0.000]
(3) No Transfers 0.872 5.604 -0.060 -1.060 -0.119 -0.938 -4.256 1.030 0.059 18.881
(0.399) (2.517) (0.016) (0.839) (0.022) (0.484) (0.572) (0.023) (0.016) [0.653]
[0.030] [0.027] [0.000] [0.207] [0.000] [0.053] [0.000] [0.192] [0.000]
(4) No Housing 1.060 6.436 -0.106 -0.504 -0.135 -0.775 -4.225 1.020 0.029 25.593
(0.413) (2.478) (0.015) (0.410) (0.019) (0.286) (0.509) (0.020) (0.014) [0.270]
[0.011] [0.010] [0.000] [0.220] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.316] [0.042]
(5) s H = s L = 0.33 1.151 6.318 -0.059 -1.141 -0.067 -1.005 -3.889 1.035 0.007 20.406
(0.413) (1.875) (0.016) (0.875) (0.019) (0.739) (0.450) (0.024) (0.015) [0.558]
[0.006] [0.001] [0.000] [0.193] [0.000] [0.174] [0.000] [0.145] [0.611]
(6) σ H,L = 20 2.019 5.844 -0.033 0.847 -0.038 0.495 -3.626 0.994 0.005 25.320
(0.654) (1.539) (0.013) (0.443) (0.015) (0.541) (0.455) (0.030) (0.005) [0.282]
[0.002] [0.000] [0.015] [0.057] [0.016] [0.361] [0.000] [0.849] [0.360]
(7) σ H,L = 0.1 0.601 10.748 -0.065 -1.954 -0.066 -1.334 -3.695 1.236 0.001 38.345
(0.221) (2.128) (0.013) (0.810) (0.016) (0.667) (0.410) (0.020) (0.014) [0.017]
[0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.016] [0.000] [0.046] [0.000] [0.000] [0.939]
(8) Alternative Wage Measure 0.662 8.611 -0.032 -3.011 -0.007 -10.391 -3.315 1.062 -0.025 26.389
   (Residualized Wages) (0.363) (2.806) (0.010) (1.304) (0.006) (2.715) (0.497) (0.011) (0.011) [0.235]
[0.069] [0.002] [0.003] [0.021] [0.286] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.026]
(9) Drop Labor Demand Moments 1.209 5.305 -0.085 -0.604 -0.079 -0.089 -4.270 -0.006 11.892
(0.700) (3.291) (0.022) (0.692) (0.023) (0.626) (0.448) N/A (0.015) [0.537]
[0.085] [0.108] [0.000] [0.383] [0.001] [0.887] [0.000] [0.677]
Table 7
GMM Estimates of Full Model
Notes:  All rows report estimates of the full model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator.  Alternate specifications are presented in each row; parameter 
estimates are listed in the columns.  See Section 6 of main text and Section A.5 of the Online Appendix for more details.  Asymptotic standard errors are in parenthesis and p-
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Notes: This gure displays the equilibrium response when the housing supply elasticity is constant. The initial
equilibrium wages, labor supply, and housing prices are given by the dot in the center of the gure. An exogenous
increase in wages encourages in-migration until labor supply rises to L+. At this point, housing prices have
risen to completely oset the increase in wages, restoring the no-arbitrage condition for workers. If there are
no mobility costs, then the equilibrium response of an equal-sized exogenous decrease in wages is symmetric,
as shown by LA
 . If out-migration is costly, however, then following a negative shock, the marginal out-migrant
must be indierent between staying and paying c to out-migrate. These mobility costs cause both population
and housing prices to respond asymmetrically: positive shocks increase population and housing prices more







Figure 2: Concave Housing Supply Curve
h s p w 0 0 =
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Notes: This gure displays the equilibrium response when the housing supply curve is concave. As the main
text and Appendix describe in more detail, a concave housing supply curve is consistent with a durable housing
stock that is not destroyed once created. As in gure 1, the initial equilibrium wages, labor supply, and housing
prices are given by the dot in the center of the gure. An exogenous increase in wages encourages in-migration
until labor supply rises to L+. At this point, housing prices have risen to completely oset the increase in
wages, restoring the no-arbitrage condition for workers. If there are no mobility costs, then housing prices still
respond symmetrically (pC
 ). Intuitively, housing costs still must adjust to exactly oset the wage changes. Only
population responds asymmetrically (as shown by LC
 ). If workers have mobility costs, then the asymmetry of
the population response is even greater (see LD

















































































































Constant housing supply elasticity
Figure 3: Model Simulations
Notes: This gure displays simulated data from the model described in Section 2. See the Appendix for more de-
tails on the simulation. The graphs clarify that an asymmetric response of population to the labor demand shock
(delta theta) indicates the existence of a concave housing supply curve and/or the existence of heterogeneous
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Figure 4: Reduced Form Results
Notes: This gure reports nonparametric reduced form estimates using U.S. Census data and REIS data. See
Appendix for details on the data set. All graphs are nonparamaetric local linear regressions. All results
include year xed eects in the nonparametric model. The estimates are constrained to be monotonic following
the rearrangement procedure of Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2003). The 95 percent uniform
condence intervals are computed using 10,000 bootstrap replications, resampling MSAs with replacement. In
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Figure 5: Reduced Form Results, Continued
Notes: This gure reports nonparametric reduced form estimates using U.S. Census data and REIS data. See
Appendix for details on the data set. All graphs are nonparamaetric local linear regressions. All results
include year xed eects in the nonparametric model. The estimates are constrained to be monotonic following
the rearrangement procedure of Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2003). The 95 percent uniform
condence intervals are computed using 10,000 bootstrap replications, resampling MSAs with replacement. In
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Estimated Mobility Cost Function
Figure 6: GMM Estimates
Notes: This gure reports GMM estimates of the full model. The top gure presents the housing supply curve
that is estimated in the baseline model (Table 7, row 1). The middle and bottom gures report estimated
mobility functions under various assumptions about housing expenditure shares and transfer payments. See







































































































-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
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(GMM Model Estimates)
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(Counterfactual Simulation)
Figure 7: Counterfactual Simulation
Notes: This gure reports simulations based on GMM estimates of the full model. The GMM estimates are
used to run simulations similar to those presented in Figure 3. The graphs report results of two simulations:
(1) simulation based on estimates of the baseline GMM model using the existing transfer payment system and
(2) counterfactual simulation based on same estimates but transfer payment system is replaced with mobility
subsidies which reduce mobility costs by 50%.
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The sample of adults used in the analysis includes all individuals between the age of 18 and
64, were not in group quarters such as prisons and psychiatric institutions, and who lived in
a metropolitan area available in the Census IPUMS. All available MSAs are used in analysis
except for Biloxi-Gulfport, MS, Flint, MI, and Reno, NV. These MSAs are dropped because
of obvious mismeasurement of the labor demand shock. Speci￿cally, in at least one of the
decades in the sample, these MSAs experienced a greater than one standard deviation labor
demand shock according to the predicted labor demand instrument but experienced a greater
than one standard deviation change in population and rental prices of the opposite magnitude.
All results including these cities are similar.
Individuals are dropped if they report business income, farm income or work in farming
or agriculture. Individual labor supply is measured by multiplying weeks worked times usual
weekly hours worked. To be included in the sample of workers used to construct the predicted
employment measure, the worker must be in the labor force and have positive and non-missing
hours worked and annual income.
Individual hourly wages are computed by dividing yearly wage and salary income by the
product of weeks worked and usual weekly hours worked. Topcoded yearly wage income values
are multiplied by 1.5 and (following Autor and Dorn (2009)) hourly wages are set not to exceed
this value divided by (50 weeks ￿ 35 hours). Local area wage statistics are computed based
on the sample of workers who work at least 35 weeks and at least 30 hours per week. Wages
are de￿ ated using the CPI-U series.
In order to construct an estimate of the local area wage premium, log wages of the sample
described above are regressed on MSA ￿xed e⁄ects, a quadratic in potential experience (age ￿
years of education ￿ 6), 14 industry dummy variables, 6 occupation category dummy variables,
and dummy variables for gender, veteran status, marital status, and race. This regression is
run each decade and in each decade is run separately for workers with and without a college
degree. In each case, the magnitude of the MSA ￿xed e⁄ects corresponds to the local area
wage premium. All regressions and calculations of local area averages are computed using the
Census individual sampling weights.
The rental price and housing value local area premiums are computed similarly to the wage
premiums; namely, I regress the log of these variables on a quadratic in the number of bedrooms
and the number of rooms and an interaction between number of bedrooms and number of rooms.
These regressions and calculations of (unconditional) average rental prices and housing values
use the Census household weights since the housing value and rental price data are reported at
the household level. Topcoded rental prices and housing values are multiplied by 1:5.
A-1Regional Economic Information System (REIS)
The REIS data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.1 I aggregate the county-level
data into MSAs using the 1990 MSA de￿nitions. When a county spans multiple MSAs I use
1990 population weights to assign fractions of the county totals across the various MSAs.
County Business Patterns (CBP)
The County Business Patterns data are available from the U.S. Census Bureau and the
ICPSR data repository.2 I used the 1979, 1989, and 1997 CBP data to match the 1980, 1990,
and 2000 Census data described above. The 1997 CBP data were chosen because the 1998
and 1999 CBP data use the NAICS industry codes, while the CBP data before 1997 used
SIC codes. I use 3-digit SIC industry codes to construct the alternative measure of predicted
employment. Roughly 35 percent of the county-by-industry employment cells are suppressed.
In these cases, I observe the number of establishments in each establishment size bin and a ￿ ag
indicating the range of actual employment. To compute predicted employment for these cells,
I run a regression each year using the non-suppressed data and use this regression to compute
predicted employment for suppressed cells from the ￿tted values. I then compare total county
employment from the raw CBP data to the total county employment computed using the non-
suppressed cells and the predicted employment values. If these two values are not within 1%,
then I scale all of the predicted employment values by a scalar so as to make the two totals
equal, and I then check again that the predicted values lie within the ranges indicated by the
employment ￿ ag and I continue to repeat this procedure until the two totals are within 1%.
A.2 Comparative Statics
This subsection derives comparative statics for the model described in Section 2 in the special
case when there are constant returns to scale (a = 1). The comparative statics are derived for
the following three scenarios:
￿ Case 1: No mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
￿ Case 2: No mobility costs; concave housing supply curve
￿ Case 3: Large mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
Case 1: No mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
This case corresponds to the following restrictions on the housing supply curve and the
mobility cost functions: cL(￿Lit) = 0, cH(￿Hit) = 0, and ￿HS(￿ph
it) = ￿ ￿ ￿ph
it. With no
mobility costs and a constant housing supply elasticity, the model readily admits a closed-
form solution. Additionally, in this case all endogenous variables respond symmetrically ￿
meaning that equal-sized positive and negative exogenous labor demand shocks cause positive
and negative shifts of equal magnitude in all of the endogenous variables (￿wH
it , ￿wL
it, ￿Hit,
1See this website for more information: http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm#step2.
2I downloaded the 1989 and 1997 CBP data from the following URL:
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/historical.htm. The 1979 CBP data were downloaded from ICPSR at
the following URL: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00022.
A-2￿Lit, ￿ph
it, ￿tit). Mathematically, this means that changes in the endogenous variables are
linear functions of the exogenous labor demand shocks; i.e., ￿xit = ￿ Kx￿￿it where x is one of
the endogenous variables in the model. To derive these results, ￿rst note that with no mobility




































Next, note that with constant returns to scale, wages for high-skill and low-skill workers can
be written as follows:
￿ ￿ ￿w
H
it + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿w
L
it = ￿￿it


















































￿￿it ￿ ￿ K
p ￿ ￿￿it
In other words, with no mobility costs for workers and ￿rms, wages and housing prices
respond symmetrically. Transfer payments will also respond symmetrically since transfer pay-
ments are a log-linear function of low-skill wages: i.e., ￿tL
it = ￿L ￿ ￿ KwL ￿ ￿￿it ￿ ￿ Kt ￿ ￿￿it.
Finally, with a constant housing supply elasticity, the migration response is also symmetric,




gives the following two expressions:
￿Hit = ￿ K
H￿￿it
￿Lit = ￿ K
L￿￿it
where ￿ KH and ￿ KL are constants that can be written in terms of the primitive parameters of
the model (￿, ￿, ￿, sH
h , sL
h, sL
t ).3 In summary, the log-linearity of the housing supply curve
and the absence of mobility costs implies that all endogenous variables respond symmetrically
to the exogenous labor demand shock.
Case 2: No mobility costs; concave housing supply curve
Formally, this case can be written as follows: cL(￿Lit) = 0, cH(￿Hit) = 0, and ￿HS(￿ph
it)
is increasing in ￿ph
it. As in the previous case (and following the same derivation), wages,
housing prices, and transfer payments all respond symmetrically, with the same constant terms
3The constants ￿ KH and ￿ KL are de￿ned as follows:
￿ KH =
( ￿ KwH ￿ ￿ KwL) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)( ￿ KwH + ￿ ￿ KwL ￿ ￿ Kp(1 + ￿))
2(￿ ￿ 1)sH
h




it = ￿ K
wH￿￿it; ￿w
L
it = ￿ K
wL￿￿it; ￿p
h
it = ￿ K
p￿￿it; ￿t
L
it = ￿ K
t￿￿it
In case 2, however, population no longer responds symmetrically to the exogenous shock.





p￿￿it) = ( ￿ K
wH + (1 ￿ s
L




t)￿￿it + ￿Hit + ￿Lit
Since the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor is constant, we
know that ￿wH
it ￿ ￿wL
it = (￿ ￿ 1)(￿Hit ￿ ￿Lit). Combining these two expressions gives the



















where ￿H and ￿L are constant terms.4 Since ￿HS(x) is increasing in x, these expressions
imply that ￿Hit and ￿Lit are increasing in ￿￿it. In other words, because the housing supply
curve is concave, the responsiveness of high-skill and low-skill population to exogenous shocks
is convex ￿positive local labor demand shocks increase population more than negative shocks
reduce population. It is also possible to show that if sH
h < sL
h < 1 and ￿L < 0, and sL
t > 0, then
decreases in local labor demand will reduce the fraction high-skill workers in the population.5
Case 3: Large mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
Formally, this case can be de￿ned as follows: cL(￿Lit) and cH(￿Hit) are declining and
convex functions and ￿HS(￿ph
it) = ￿￿ ￿ph
it. In this case, the convexity of the mobility cost
functions imply that the mobility cost of the marginal migrant is greater in magnitude for
decreases in population than for equal-sized increases in population. As mentioned in the
introduction, one way this could arise is if the city is small relative to the rest of the world, so
that the mobility cost of the marginal in-migrant is negligible. In this case, cH(￿Hit) would
be de￿ned such that cH(￿H) = 0 for all ￿Hit ￿ 0, but cH(￿Hit) is decreasing in ￿Hit for all
￿Hit < 0.





h = sh, ￿H = ￿L = ￿, and cL(x) = cH(x) 8x), it can be shown that wages still respond
4The constants ￿H and ￿L are de￿ned as follows:
￿H = ￿ Kp + ￿ KwH + ￿ KwL + ( ￿ KwH ￿ ￿ KwL)=(￿ ￿ 1)
￿L = ￿H ￿ 2( ￿ KwH ￿ ￿ KwL)=(￿ ￿ 1)
5To see this, note that ￿H ￿ ￿L =
￿
KwH ￿ KwL￿
=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿￿. If sL
h > sH
h , ￿L < 0, and sL
t > 0, then ￿
KwH ￿ KwL￿
< 0. Since ￿ ￿ 1 < 0 (since ￿H;L > 0), this implies
￿
KwH ￿ KwL￿
=(￿ ￿ 1) > 0. Thus declines
in ￿￿ will reduce ￿H ￿ ￿L.
A-4symmetrically as in the previous two cases. By simplifying the problem to make high-skill and
low-skill workers identical except for their e¢ ciency units of labor, it is straightforward to show
that ￿wH
it = ￿wL
it = ￿￿it and that ￿Hit = ￿Lit. These simpli￿cations result in the following
expressions for housing market and labor supply conditions, respectively:
￿p
h
it ￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ 2sh(￿￿￿it + ￿Hit) = 0 (1)
c(￿Hit) + ￿￿￿it ￿ sh￿p
h
it = 0
where ￿ = (1 ￿ st) + st￿. Combining these expressions gives the following:
2sh￿Hit ￿ (1 + ￿)c(￿Hit) = (1 + ￿ ￿ 2sh)￿￿￿it
Since c(￿Hit) is declining and convex, this implies that ￿Hit is convex in ￿￿it.6 Since ￿Hit
is convex in ￿￿it, then by equation (1), ￿ph
it is convex in ￿￿it. In other words, unlike the other
cases, in this case housing prices respond asymmetrically, where positive shocks increase housing
prices more than negative shocks reduce housing prices. The intuition is that the convexity
of mobility cost function makes out-migration disproportionately costly (as compared to in-
migration). Because of these mobility costs, following negative shocks workers are willing to
pay more for housing than they would in the absence of mobility costs, which bids up the price
of housing following price declines.
A.3 Model Simulation Details
The data used to create Figure 3 are simulated from the model described in Section 2. The same
parameters used in the GMM estimation are used in the simulation; i.e., sL
t = 0:05, sL
h = 0:34,
sH
h = 0:30, ￿ = 0:29, ￿ = 0:37. The returns-to-scale parameter ￿ = 1 is used, and the transfer
payment elasticity used is ￿L = ￿5:0. The mobility cost functions and housing supply function





H, ￿Hs(x) = ￿h(exp(￿
hx)￿1)=￿
h. The values of these parameters
depend on the scenario as follows:
￿ Case 1: ￿H = ￿L = 0, ￿h = 4:0, ￿
h = 0
￿ Case 2: ￿H = ￿L = 0, ￿h = 2:0, ￿
h = 4:0
￿ Case 2: ￿H = ￿L = ￿0:2, ￿
H = ￿
L = ￿100, ￿h = 4:0, ￿
h = 0
A.4 A Simple Model of Durable Housing
This section outlines a model to provide simple microfoundations for a concave housing supply
curve (i.e., housing supply elasticity that is larger for increases in housing demand than for
decreases in housing demand). As in Section 2, the model here is a two period model, where a
6Formally, a su¢ cient condition for this result to hold is that (1￿st)+st￿ > 0 and sh < ((1￿st)+st￿)(1+￿).
In words, transfer payments provide partial wage insurance, and housing expenditure share cannot be so large
so that negative shocks would cause net in-migration of low-skill labor.
A-5single city is shocked out of a large number of cities. The model includes a labor market and
a housing market. Production of a homogeneous tradable good is constant returns to scale
and uses only (homogeneous) labor as an input. All workers have identical Cobb-Douglas
preferences for housing and the tradable good, so that expenditure share on housing (sh) is
constant.
Housing is supplied by absentee landlords who live in other cities. The housing supply
is homogeneous in terms of workers￿willingness-to-pay but there are heterogeneous costs to
supplying housing (arising, perhaps, from topographic features of the land). This is modeled
by assuming that the maximum housing supply is ￿ HS (where ￿ HS is assumed to be large enough
so that we are not close to a corner solution) and that the cost of supplying an in￿nitesimal unit
of housing is distributed according to the following density function: f(c) = ￿h
￿ c (c=￿ c)
￿h￿1, where








. Thus the initial housing market equilibrium is given







Using a similar simplifying assumption as in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), I assume that
housing is occasionally (and randomly) destroyed, and that the cost of rebuilding is the same
as the initial cost of building. Mathematically, I assume that just before the labor demand
shock, a random fraction ￿ of the initial housing supply collapses and needs to be re-built.
For increases in housing demand, all housing that collapsed is immediately rebuilt in between
periods, and housing supply further expands according to the elasticity of housing supply (￿h).
For decreases in housing demand, however, the ￿e⁄ective￿housing supply elasticity is now only
￿ ￿ ￿h because some of the housing that was previously built does not collapse and cannot be
destroyed. Unless ￿ = 1 (i.e., housing is not durable at all and completely collapses between
periods), these assumptions imply that the housing supply curve is nonlinear, asymmetric, and
concave.
The equilibrium changes in wages, population, and housing prices following an exogenous
labor demand shock (￿￿it) are as follows. The wage change in the city receiving the shock is
￿wit = ￿￿it. Perfect mobility of workers implies that ￿wit = sh￿ph
it. This implies that ￿ph
it =
￿￿it=sh. In other words, both wages and housing prices respond symmetrically. For positive
labor demand shocks, population increases by ￿nit = (1+￿h)￿ph
it￿￿wit = (1+￿h￿sh)=sh￿￿￿it.
For negative labor demand shocks, population decreases by ￿nit = (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿h ￿ sh)=sh ￿ ￿￿it.
Assuming sh > 0, ￿h > 0 and 0 < ￿ < 1, then positive shocks increase population more than
equal-sized negative shocks reduce population.
The key di⁄erence between this model and the model in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) is
that the marginal value and the average value of housing are equal in the simple model in this
section, while in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) housing units have heterogeneous, location-speci￿c
amenities, which causes average housing prices to respond asymmetrically due to compositional
changes in the location-speci￿c amenities in the housing stock. The empirical evidence in this
paper suggests that housing prices respond symmetrically to exogenous labor demand shocks,
which is more consistent with the model in this paper.
A-6A.5 GMM Estimation
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The orthogonality conditions are summarized as E[m] = 0. The parameters to estimate are

















































where ^ ￿1 is re-estimated using ^ ￿
GMM
instead of ^ ￿
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A-8Industry Name Mean Min Max
Persistently Expanding Industries
Eating and drinking places 641 3.99% 14.17% 1.39% 32.78%
Offices and clinics of physicians 812 0.93% 25.41% 1.28% 42.59%
Legal services 841 0.79% 32.33% 7.54% 63.76%
Computer and data processing services 732 0.75% 75.71% 20.01% 139.09%
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services 890 0.47% 15.62% 4.93% 34.52%
Services incidental to transportation 432 0.45% 50.41% 1.48% 85.46%
Services to dwellings and other buildings 722 0.43% 30.51% 4.10% 73.12%
Offices and clinics of dentists 820 0.43% 26.94% 13.17% 54.00%
Personnel supply services 731 0.39% 35.46% 0.80% 62.28%
Landscape and horticultural services 20 0.34% 55.19% 5.36% 158.68%
Detective and protective services 740 0.30% 42.85% 17.52% 103.97%
Residential care facilities, without nursing 870 0.27% 86.39% 33.35% 168.29%
Drugs 181 0.27% 12.75% 3.79% 22.01%
Sporting goods, bicycles, and hobby stores 651 0.23% 17.37% 11.76% 24.11%
Veterinary services 12 0.16% 40.92% 26.99% 54.86%
Retail nurseries and garden stores 582 0.12% 61.71% 12.43% 152.46%
Museums, art galleries, and zoos 872 0.11% 56.61% 28.32% 110.27%
Offices and clinics of optometrists 822 0.05% 25.20% 18.55% 37.94%
Offices and clinics of chiropractors 821 0.05% 92.45% 14.21% 191.25%
Persistently Declining Industries
Apparel and accessories, except knit 151 0.89% -39.17% -59.31% -18.67%
Aircraft and parts 352 0.65% -26.94% -40.51% -10.53%
Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and finishing mills 270 0.51% -26.75% -52.32% -10.65%
Radio, TV, and communication equipment 341 0.48% -35.55% -42.74% -27.94%
Railroads 400 0.48% -28.70% -51.27% -6.72%
Yarn, thread, and fabric mills 142 0.44% -33.50% -55.91% -11.45%
Newspaper publishing and printing 171 0.44% -15.78% -20.69% -13.19%
Laundry, cleaning, and garment services 771 0.39% -25.61% -49.71% -6.59%
Metalworking machinery 320 0.31% -26.67% -31.42% -17.49%
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 160 0.31% -18.36% -32.41% -2.25%
Motor vehicles and equipment 500 0.26% -13.26% -30.43% -5.03%
Ship and boat building and repairing 360 0.26% -21.82% -33.81% -6.93%
Beverage industries 120 0.20% -15.67% -31.90% -1.72%
Air force 941 0.20% -29.65% -46.78% -12.51%
Paperboard containers and boxes 162 0.18% -21.47% -33.70% -7.28%
Variety stores 592 0.18% -47.74% -48.42% -47.07%
Canned, frozen, and preserved fruits and vegetables 102 0.18% -17.75% -26.05% -8.16%
Other rubber products, and plastics footwear and belting 211 0.18% -33.14% -61.17% -16.64%
Navy 942 0.18% -27.63% -41.14% -14.12%
Other primary metal industries 280 0.17% -33.08% -58.09% -8.57%
Stable Industries
Elementary and secondary schools 842 6.53% 3.25% -3.59% 7.45%
All construction 60 5.94% 5.25% 1.61% 7.99%
Colleges and universities 850 2.21% 5.40% -5.68% 16.30%
Grocery stores 601 2.06% -0.70% -18.49% 19.74%
Insurance 711 2.02% -1.90% -10.44% 2.60%
Department stores 591 1.78% -8.54% -19.40% 11.30%
Trucking service 410 1.54% 5.91% 1.36% 10.47%
Telephone communications 441 1.21% -9.32% -19.93% 3.16%
Motor vehicle dealers 612 0.95% -1.76% -8.87% 6.85%
Hotels and motels 762 0.95% 6.60% -9.80% 19.21%
Groceries and related products 550 0.74% -9.67% -12.00% -6.04%
Religious organizations 880 0.65% 10.21% 1.45% 19.39%
Administration of economic programs 931 0.50% -11.06% -15.69% -4.20%
Beauty shops 772 0.44% -5.35% -16.45% 6.59%
Furniture and home furnishings stores 631 0.44% -0.18% -7.68% 5.36%
Sawmills, planing mills, and millwork 231 0.42% 0.28% -13.17% 10.24%
Bus service and urban transit 401 0.40% -8.17% -18.13% 0.34%
Agricultural production, livestock 11 0.39% -4.56% -13.70% 10.29%
Public finance, taxation, and monetary policy 921 0.29% -4.23% -8.72% -0.25%
Water supply and irrigation 470 0.18% -1.98% -4.71% 5.08%
Appendix Table A1
Industry Categories (Top 20 List By Average National Employment Share)






Justice, public order, and safety 910 2.08% -2.02% -42.53% 26.30%
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 351 1.31% -9.15% -21.15% 24.42%
National security and international affairs 932 1.02% -14.28% -69.36% 50.12%
Automotive repair and related services 751 0.68% 14.32% -23.44% 30.71%
Apparel and accessory stores, except shoe 623 0.64% -5.43% -28.42% 30.70%
Administration of human resources programs 922 0.58% -0.25% -38.36% 29.24%
Management and public relations services 892 0.49% 17.01% -31.54% 54.16%
Radio, tv, and computer stores 633 0.38% 17.95% -32.45% 102.77%
Oil and gas extraction 42 0.38% 7.56% -36.31% 55.97%
Computers and related equipment 322 0.37% -5.86% -39.46% 48.79%
Research, development, and testing services 891 0.36% 31.34% -20.44% 106.12%
Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts 362 0.27% 15.85% -48.89% 62.69%
Iron and steel foundries 271 0.23% -22.67% -56.79% 62.60%
Scientific and controlling instruments 371 0.22% 3.56% -22.68% 34.13%
Savings institutions, including credit unions 701 0.22% 8.96% -32.44% 44.24%
Administration of environmental quality and housing programs 930 0.21% 1.66% -50.06% 44.03%
Hardware, plumbing and heating supplies 521 0.20% -2.08% -45.76% 31.74%
Drugs, chemicals, and allied products 541 0.20% 0.38% -26.71% 38.45%
Petroleum refining 200 0.19% -15.09% -32.74% 25.77%
Catalog and mail order houses 663 0.16% 11.19% -23.37% 71.12%
Other Industries
Hospitals 831 4.63% 5.56% -8.14% 22.95%
Banking 700 1.76% 0.40% -20.39% 18.42%
Real estate, including real estate-insurance offices 712 1.26% 11.18% -14.27% 33.53%
Nursing and personal care facilities 832 1.18% 21.88% -8.46% 74.03%
Printing, publishing, and allied industries, except newspapers 172 1.07% -10.11% -20.00% 10.63%
U.S. postal service 412 0.85% -10.99% -28.24% 1.17%
Agricultural production, crops 10 0.78% -12.45% -28.96% 9.86%
Engineering, architectural, and surveying services 882 0.72% 29.53% -6.11% 67.63%
Machinery, equipment, and supplies 530 0.66% -12.22% -47.76% 19.83%
Child day care services 862 0.66% 39.53% -6.98% 82.69%
Security, commodity brokerage, and investment companies 710 0.63% 29.48% -18.73% 59.34%
Electric light and power 450 0.61% -0.78% -9.00% 21.04%
Air transportation 421 0.59% -8.72% -22.35% 13.89%
Furniture and fixtures 242 0.56% -6.62% -27.01% 4.43%
Drug stores 642 0.53% 4.73% -13.18% 24.10%
Lumber and building material retailing 580 0.52% 15.50% -4.47% 48.91%
Gasoline service stations 621 0.48% -14.80% -28.20% 9.14%
Fabricated structural metal products 282 0.44% -13.01% -27.63% 3.77%
Meat products 100 0.35% -4.13% -25.30% 16.68%
Radio and television broadcasting and cable 440 0.33% 21.23% -5.68% 48.12%
Notes:  All industry codes in the Census IPUMS data set are grouped into one of the five categories in this table based on employment 
growth during 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2007.  The industries within each cataegory are then sorted based on 
average employment share of national population and the top 20 industries in each category are listed in this table.  See Section 5 in 
main text for more details on the industry categories.  Industries that are coded as "catch-all" industry codes are excluded from this table.
























% Change in predicted employment      (β) 0.842 0.714 0.808 0.633 0.943 1.155 1.142
(0.151) (0.360) (0.155) (0.320) (0.177) (0.379) (0.293)
   [0.000]    [0.048]    [0.000]    [0.049]    [0.000]    [0.003]    [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  -0.999 -2.765 -0.742 -2.653 -2.496 -8.769 2.804
(2.758) (6.310) (2.889) (5.647) (3.593) (7.043) (4.944)
   [0.717]    [0.662]    [0.797]    [0.639]    [0.488]    [0.215]    [0.571]
Marginal effect at −σ   (A) 0.912 0.907 0.860 0.818 1.117 1.767 0.947
(0.243) (0.580) (0.254) (0.511) (0.304) (0.563) (0.390)
[0.000] [0.119] [0.001] [0.111] [0.000] [0.002] [0.016]
Marginal effect at +σ   (B) 0.773 0.521 0.757 0.448 0.769 0.544 1.338
(0.247) (0.558) (0.255) (0.504) (0.309) (0.673) (0.507)
[0.002] [0.351] [0.003] [0.376] [0.014] [0.420] [0.009]
p-value of test (A) = (B) 0.717 0.662 0.797 0.639 0.488 0.215 0.571
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.596 0.295 0.545 0.271 0.486 0.346 0.300
R
2 0.099 0.144 0.182 0.201 0.121 0.172 0.777
N 430 430 430 430 364 364 364
Appendix Table A2
Alternative Measures of Housing Values and Rental Prices
Notes:  All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7).  Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts and the OFHEO housing 
price indexes.  Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs in columns (1) through (4); in remaining columns the sample is a balanced panel of 182 MSAs 
with non-missing data from FHFA (formerly OFHEO).  Columns (5) and (6) reproduce columns (1) and (2) on the FHFA sub-sample.  Dependent variable is 
always the percentage change across periods.  The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial 
composition with national changes in industry employment shares.  See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details.  All specifications include year 
fixed effects.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values 
are in brackets.
































% Change in predicted empl.      (β) -2.367 -1.966 -4.841 -1.738 -2.151 -1.140 -1.725 -0.379 -0.914 -0.099
(0.615) (0.613) (0.863) (0.631) (1.130) (0.428) (0.639) (0.739) (0.344) (0.023)
   [0.000]    [0.002]    [0.000]    [0.006]    [0.058]    [0.008]    [0.007]    [0.608]    [0.008]    [0.000]
(% Change in predicted empl.)
2  (δ)  -21.779 -18.727 -41.397 -22.477 -14.332 -15.732 -3.267 -31.143 1.725 0.428
(12.139) (11.690) (17.540) (12.828) (19.521) (8.953) (11.771) (11.194) (7.372) (0.361)
   [0.074]    [0.111]    [0.019]    [0.081]    [0.464]    [0.080]    [0.782]    [0.006]    [0.815]    [0.237]
Marginal effect at −σ   (A) -0.847 -0.659 -1.953 -0.169 -1.150 -0.042 -1.497 1.794 -1.034 -0.129
(1.030) (1.009) (1.394) (1.199) (1.802) (0.841) (1.215) (0.971) (0.723) (0.030)
[0.412] [0.514] [0.163] [0.888] [0.524] [0.960] [0.219] [0.066] [0.155] [0.000]
Marginal effect at +σ   (B) -3.887 -3.273 -7.730 -3.306 -3.151 -2.237 -1.953 -2.552 -0.793 -0.069
(1.064) (1.031) (1.595) (0.980) (1.737) (0.664) (0.831) (1.170) (0.492) (0.039)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.071] [0.001] [0.020] [0.030] [0.108] [0.076]
p-value of test (A) = (B) 0.074 0.111 0.019 0.081 0.464 0.080 0.782 0.006 0.815 0.237
p-value of nonparam. specification test 0.241 0.345 0.017 0.193 0.046 0.118 0.457 0.031 0.469 0.081
R
2 0.403 0.438 0.273 0.797 0.697 0.557 0.534 0.017 0.340 0.045
N 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430
Table A3
Results for Various Measures of Public Assistance Expenditures
Notes:  All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7).  Data for dependent variables come from the REIS, except for column (10) which uses Census data on 
disability in the adult population.  Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs.  Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods except for column (10) 
which reports percentage point changes.  The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national 
changes in industry employment shares.  See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details.  All specifications include year fixed effects.  Standard errors, adjusted to 
allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.






























% Change in predicted employment      (β) 1.802 1.659 2.142 1.654 1.743 1.706 1.847 1.797 1.870 1.764
(0.445) (0.447) (0.545) (0.539) (0.475) (0.380) (0.451) (0.467) (0.455) (0.504)
   [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.002]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.001]
(% Change in predicted employment)
2  (δ)  28.010 27.839 22.645 29.303 29.633 20.857 27.388 28.840 31.122 30.672
(7.905) (7.982) (8.989) (9.266) (8.377) (7.491) (8.019) (8.168) (8.562) (8.188)
   [0.000]    [0.001]    [0.013]    [0.002]    [0.001]    [0.006]    [0.001]    [0.001]    [0.000]    [0.000]
Marginal effect at −σ   (A) -0.152 -0.284 0.562 -0.390 -0.325 0.251 -0.065 -0.216 -0.301 -0.376
(0.847) (0.879) (1.044) (1.033) (0.915) (0.664) (0.864) (0.884) (0.875) (0.892)
[0.858] [0.747] [0.591] [0.706] [0.723] [0.706] [0.940] [0.807] [0.731] [0.674]
Marginal effect at +σ   (B) 3.757 3.602 3.722 3.699 3.811 3.162 3.758 3.809 4.042 3.904
(0.535) (0.498) (0.539) (0.591) (0.546) (0.628) (0.535) (0.553) (0.602) (0.604)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of test (A) = (B) 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
p-value of nonparametric specification test 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.149 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
R
2 0.315 0.324 0.334 0.333 0.322 0.288 0.316 0.323 0.297 0.303
N 430 408 382 342 402 360 404 372 404 366
Notes:  All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7).  Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs.  Columns report results from dropping one of the nine Census 
regions.  Dependent variable is always the percentage change in population across periods.  The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional 
differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.  See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details.  All specifications include 
year fixed effects.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in 
brackets.
Appendix Table A4
Robustness Dropping Each Region
Dependent Variable: % Change in Population
A-13